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  ABSTRACT 
As reconfigurable devices‟ capacities and the complexity of applications that use them increase, 
the need for self-reliance of deployed systems becomes increasingly prominent.  A Sustainable 
Modular Adaptive Redundancy Technique (SMART) composed of a dual-layered organic system 
is proposed, analyzed, implemented, and experimentally evaluated. SMART relies upon a variety 
of self-regulating properties to control availability, energy consumption, and area used, in 
dynamically-changing environments that require high degree of adaptation. The hardware layer 
is implemented on a Xilinx Virtex-4 Field Programmable Gate Array (FPGA) to provide self-
repair using a novel approach called a Reconfigurable Adaptive Redundancy System (RARS). The 
software layer supervises the organic activities within the FPGA and extends the self-healing 
capabilities through application-independent, intrinsic, evolutionary repair techniques to leverage 
the benefits of dynamic Partial Reconfiguration (PR).  
A SMART prototype is evaluated using a Sobel edge detection application.  This prototype is 
shown to provide sustainability for stressful occurrences of transient and permanent fault 
injection procedures while still reducing energy consumption and area requirements. An Organic 
Genetic Algorithm (OGA) technique is shown capable of consistently repairing hard faults while 
maintaining correct edge detector outputs, by exploiting spatial redundancy in the reconfigurable 
hardware. 
A Monte Carlo driven Continuous Markov Time Chains (CTMC) simulation is conducted to 
compare SMART‟s availability to industry-standard Triple Modular Technique (TMR) 
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techniques. Based on nine use cases, parameterized with realistic fault and repair rates acquired 
from publically available sources, the results indicate that availability is significantly enhanced 
by the adoption of fast repair techniques targeting aging-related hard-faults. Under harsh 
environments, SMART is shown to improve system availability from 36.02% with lengthy repair 
techniques to 98.84% with fast ones. This value increases to “five nines” (99.9998%) under 
relatively more favorable conditions. 
Lastly, SMART is compared to twenty eight standard TMR benchmarks that are generated by 
the widely-accepted BL-TMR tools. Results show that in seven out of nine use cases, SMART is 
the recommended technique, with power savings ranging from 22% to 29%, and area savings 
ranging from 17% to 24%, while still maintaining the same level of availability.  
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
In this chapter, the significance of the problem will be defined and a solution framework will be 
presented. Moreover, the contributions of the dissertation will be highlighted, emphasizing the 
innovation and novelty in SMART as a fault-tolerance technique targeting reconfigurable 
devices in mission-critical applications. 
1.1. Need for Autonomous Repair in Mission Critical Applications 
Current high-performance processing systems frequently consist of heterogeneous processor 
cores or subsystems that depend on one another in nontrivial ways. Each subsystem is itself a 
multi-component system with diverse capabilities. The organization of these subsystems is 
typically static; it is determined with great care at design time and optimized for a particular 
mode of operation. This design strategy is appropriate for systems that are accessible for repair 
when their components fail. However, systems which are unreachable once deployed present a 
different set of challenges. In these systems, the failure of a single component may result in 
large-scale inefficiency or even complete mission failure. 
Therefore, electronic systems operating in demanding environments require increased capability 
for autonomous fault tolerance and self-adaptation, especially as system complexities and 
interdependencies increase. Hence, the goal of  Organic Computing (OC) techniques [1, 2] is to 
create systems capable of adaptive and  fault-tolerant behaviors. The OC paradigm is compatible 
with biologically-inspired computing concepts that emphasize the so-called "self-x properties" 
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which emerge at the system-level and represent life-like properties such as self-configuration, 
self-reorganization, and self-healing [2, 3]. These properties must be maintained in an 
autonomous fashion yet be sufficiently constrained to avoid the emergence of undesirable 
behaviors. 
Complex digital systems that are able to operate autonomously for long periods of time without 
external repair are essential for reducing the risk involved in mission-critical applications, such 
as space, deep-sea, manned and unmanned avionic missions, and deployments to remote or 
perilous terrestrial areas. For instance, a military or commercial satellite that cannot recover from 
a hardware failure becomes orbiting space junk or must be replaced, thereby incurring great 
economic costs and negative societal impact. In contrast, a sustainable self-aware satellite would 
offer increased dependability and extended lifetime. Organic computing is one of the most 
promising approaches to realizing such dependable systems. 
1.2. Advantages of Reconfigurable Logic to Support Fault-Tolerance 
The OC paradigm is seldom tied to a particular platform or implementation, which makes it 
relatively broad in its impact and unrestricted with respect to any specific research or industrial 
context. Nonetheless, the immense flexibility of reconfigurable hardware devices makes them 
especially suited to hosting OC applications [4]. The fact that SRAM-based FPGAs can be 
dynamically reconfigured has made them a popular hardware platform for numerous OC systems 
[4, 5].  
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Several external environmental or internally-driven performance demands may require a change 
in the configuration of a multi-component system to maintain functionality and throughput 
throughout an extended mission [6]. For instance, a fault may occur in an individual component, 
which must then be replaced, refurbished to some degree, or otherwise bypassed. Although one 
could hypothesize that routine hardware failures would be a likely trigger for configuration 
change, other mission-level considerations, such as a storage device reaching its capacity or the 
environment deviating from expectation, could be handled similarly. In either case, existing 
modules must be reconfigured; SRAM-based FPGA devices facilitate this flexibility by enabling 
dynamic device reconfiguration.  
SRAM FPGAs represent ideal platforms for hosting organic computing hardware 
implementations due to their ability to reconfigure a system at any time to adapt to events that 
necessitate a change in the hardware, such as fault-occurrence or changes in mission 
requirements. The following reasons justify our selection of reconfigurable devices to host 
SMART: 
1. Reconfigurable hardware allows fast, in situ reconfiguration of a hardware device. This 
characteristic has been utilized in SMART to circumvent faulty resources in the hardware 
by maintaining collections of Amorphous Spares (AS), which are pre-seeded bitstream 
files that represent the same functionality of the circuit, though with different 
implementations or area constraints. Once errors are detected, these AS can be 
downloaded and tested individually to determine if any of them do not make use of the 
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faulty resource on the fabric. This approach is not possible on Application Specific 
Integrated Circuits (ASIC) due to the fixed nature of their hardware fabric. 
2. Dynamic PR allows for the reconfiguration of faulty components while the system is kept 
online. This method can be coupled with hardware redundancy such that the repair 
process can operate on the faulty part of the system, while other redundant parts continue 
in a normal operation mode to drive the system output. SMART employs this technique 
to provide efficient repair so that the system can continue to provide the highest possible 
performance while being repaired.  
3. Time-multiplexing of different applications on the same FPGA greatly benefits organic 
systems, which normally require adaptive and flexible design practices, such as changing 
the functionality of the hardware during certain stages of the mission to support another 
application or other operational modes. Different bitstreams for different applications can 
be stored and downloaded whenever the mission demands their use.  
4. Reconfiguration capability facilitates organic repair through evolutionary algorithms. 
Reconfigurability allows for testing the fitness of individuals on the hardware, and also 
enables direct evolution of the most compact presentation of the circuit, which is the 
Configuration Bit Stream (CBS) that stores the logic and routing configuration of the user 
circuit. Both Intrinsic fitness evaluation and direct CBS evolution are not possible in 
ASIC because the hardware logic and routing cannot be changed after fabrication. The 
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OGA that we implement in this work has many properties that are made possible due to 
the reconfigurability of the underlying hardware, as discussed in Section 4.2.3 
5. Reconfigurable systems based on FPGAs also have the option to integrate flexible soft-
core processors such as Microblaze on the same fabric with the application hardware, 
which provides an opportunity to implement a complete SoC application. High-end 
FPGA boards are also equipped with embedded cores such as PowerPC that interface 
with the FPGA and control its reconfigurability via the Internal Configuration Access 
Port (ICAP). 
6. A multitude of computing and memory resources such as High-Speed Digital Signal 
Processing (DSP) blocks operating at high speeds, block RAMs, FIFOs, and other built-
in hardware logic are available on today‟s FPGAs to provide many options for a broad 
range of applications and accelerated implementations of commonly used image 
processing, arithmetic, communication, and encryption applications   
7. Reconfigurable logic provides the option to change the clock frequency for a select part 
of the fabric at run time through the use of the built-in Digital Clock Manager (DCM) 
block. Therefore, an OC system can optimize the power usage for an application to meet 
mission requirements. 
Despite of all the aforementioned advantages, using FPGA devices rather than their ASIC 
counterparts in mission-critical applications is a double-edged sword. On the one hand, they 
allow the support of self-x capabilities through reconfiguration. On the other hand, such 
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capabilities can introduce new fault vulnerabilities to the hardware. Transient faults, which 
commonly occur as a Single Event Upset (SEU) [7] are a primary source of concern when 
deploying SRAM-based devices in mission-critical applications such as space applications [8]. 
SEUs can occur when a charged particle impacts the silicon substrate with enough energy to 
incur either a transient pulse in a combinational logic or a state flip in a sequential circuit. The 
former is only articulated if a state storage component, such as a Flip-Flop, is affected by the 
transient signal. Hence, the effect of SEU on combinational logic in ASICs could vanish without 
any repairs. On the other hand, SEUs hitting memory cells are more likely to cause damage 
because they flip the state of a stored bit, which affects the system until the relevant Flip-Flop is 
loaded with a new correct value.  
In SRAM-based FPGAs, where even the combinational logic is implemented using SRAM Look-
Up Tables (LUTs), SEUs gain amplified importance as every SEU is a state-flip that can affect 
both the sequential and the combinational logic.  To this end, space-qualified versions of SRAM-
based FPGAs are commercially available for mitigating SEUs at the circuit level such as Xilinx‟s 
QPro [6], Indeed, a new field of research that targets fault tolerance in reconfigurable platforms 
has emerged [6] to take advantage of the inherent reconfigurability of FPGAs. In conjunction 
with the use of high reliability components, mission-critical applications can benefit from PR to 
survive the various sources of failures that might affect reconfigurable resources.  
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1.3. Contributions of the Dissertation 
In this dissertation, we introduce SMART, a novel fault-tolerance technique exhibiting many 
advantages over the manufacturer‟s current standardized fault handling method, which is the 
Triple Modular Redundancy (TMR) Technique. SMART provides Adaptive Modular 
Redundancy (AMR), in contrast to the fixed one in TMR, by exploiting the reconfigurability 
property of the FPGA devices [9]. Moreover, SMART provides handling for hard-faults which 
are seldom considered in self-repair techniques due to their supposed rareness. We demonstrate 
via standard evaluation metrics and actual reported fault rates that hard-fault repair is needed to 
provide sustainable mission operations in harsh environments. Moreover, not just that SMART 
provides improved availability; it does it in a resource-aware fashion by optimizing energy 
consumption and area usage.  
1.3.1. Design and Implementation of SMART 
In this work, we present the design and implementation of SMART, a two-layered sustainable 
autonomic architecture for fault handling.  The autonomous hardware layer is implemented on a 
Virtex-4 Xilinx XC4VSX35 FPGA device [10], while the software layer is intended to be on a 
PowerPC embedded core with ICAP interface to the FPGA device to download different CBSs 
for repair purposes. In this work, in order to facilitate testing and verification, the software layer 
resides on a host PC that is connected to the FPGA via a Xilinx parallel cable IV. SMART is 
inspired by the OC paradigm, and thus the emergence of self-x properties is observed at the 
system level after assembling the individual parts into a single, integrated, fault-tolerant system.  
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 The hardware layer implements a decentralized observer/controller processing loop to adjust the 
configuration of the system based on real-time mission information. It accomplishes this task 
using a novel general-purpose redundancy scheme called RARS [11] which does not have a 
predetermined number of redundant modules like other fixed redundancy schemes commonly 
found in the literature such as Duplex, TMR, and pair-and-spare. [12, 13]. Instead, RARS can 
reconfigure its components at run-time to provide the appropriate level of redundancy that 
matches the mission status. The distributed controller function in RARS, which is called the 
Autonomic Element (AE), monitors the status of the redundant parts that implement the user 
application, called the Functional Elements (FEs), and collects the reports from various sensors 
to make decisions about which configuration to select. Having multiple RARS modules 
facilitates the decentralization of the organic layer while reducing single points of failure. 
RARS is a resource-conservative adaptive redundancy architecture that is only reconfigured to a 
high power/area configuration when multiple instances of the FE are needed to identify, mask, or 
repair faults. Other approaches like TMR run in triplex mode even when faults are not present, 
consuming three times the simplex configuration resources only to provide fault-tolerance during 
brief intervals of the mission lifetime during which the system is subject to faults. RARS saving 
benefits will be shown analytically and experimentally in Chapter 6. 
Still, the fault-tolerance of RARS is restricted by the limited capacity of the available hardware 
to support alternative routing and/or logic for faulty parts. Therefore, a monitoring and 
refurbishment layer that resides above the hardware layer serves two purposes. The first is to 
collect the hardware status reports and render them into a human-readable format so that system 
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operators can monitor the deployed system and interact with it. The second is to provide active 
repair in the event of faults, either via scrubbing [13], which involves rewriting the configuration 
memory with a fault-free CBS to correct any SEU occurrences in the configuration logic, or via a 
dynamic refurbishment process for permanent faults using Evolvable Hardware (EHW) 
approaches [14] .  The evolutionary approach employed in this work is a novel Genetic 
Algorithm (GA) that implements design practices suiting the organic nature of the system and 
thus is referred to as an Organic GA (OGA). The software layer reads the performance and status 
of RARS and triggers the refurbishment procedures whenever the redundancy degree of RARS is 
not adequate to mask the faults.  
The two layers are connected via Xilinx Parallel Cable that connects between a standard Joint 
Test Action Group (JTAG) [15] port on the FPGA and the parallel port on the host PC. On the 
FPGA, the JTAG communicates with RARS via the General-Purpose Native JTAG Tester 
(GNAT) [15] platform. The messages themselves are communicated using a special 
communication protocol that was designed specifically for this system. This communication link 
carries messages between the two layers as part of the fault-tolerance algorithm and also 
transmits the CBS to reconfigure parts of the system as needed.  
Dynamic PR is adopted to improve two aspects of the organic repair. First, it significantly 
reduces the configuration time as compared to the full bitstream configuration approach due to 
the small size of the bitstream. Second, it allows the system to remain online while its faulty 
parts are being reconfigured; this helps increase the availability of the system by enabling it to 
maintain functionality even during repair. Dynamic PR is used in two stages of the repair cycle. 
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It is first used in the scrubbing stage when the AS are repetitively configured on the FPGA 
searching for a spare that exclude the faulty resource, and second, it is used by the OGA when 
candidate solutions are reconfigured on the FPGA for fitness evaluation. 
In this work, we implement the well-known Sobel edge detection [16] application on the 
hardware layer to illustrate the organic self-healing, self-configuring, and self-monitoring 
capabilities of RARS. In addition, we implement the software layer and connect it to the circuit 
on the FPGA through the JTAG port. This layer is shown to successfully monitor and supervise 
the organic hardware layer and also performs evolutionary refurbishment of faulty modules. 
After combining all modules into one integrated fault-tolerant platform, we scrutinized the 
system behavior while processing a real-time video stream under various fault scenarios. The 
hardware layer demonstrated emergent self-monitoring and self-reorganization properties that 
allowed the system to sustain even in the presence of successive faults. When the number of 
faults exceeded the capabilities of the hardware layer, the higher-level software layer augmented 
the response through self-reconfiguration and self-healing. 
1.3.2. Autonomous Fault-Tolerance Technique to Improve Availability 
Figure 1 depicts the high-level view of SMART‟s repair methods and the various events that 
trigger their executions. The central state of SMART operation is the fault-free operation (1) that 
requires only RARS‟s self-monitoring techniques to detect the occurrence of faults. An SEU can 
impact the FPGA resources and cause a single bit flip in one of the LUTs. This LUT may fall 
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either on the data path of the application, i.e., a user register that stores an intermediate 
calculation value, or on the logic path, i.e., an LUT that is programmed to implement the 
intended circuit functionality. SEUs that affect LUTs in the user logic can be overwritten by 
subsequent operations without any repair interventions. This type of fault is classified as 
transient, and normally fades away in the regular execution cycle. The transient effect can be 
masked with redundancy techniques (2) until the fault is corrected.  
However, if the soft fault affects an LUT in the reconfigurable logic, then the bit flip will remain 
manifested until the unlikely event of another SEU impacting the exact same location. A bit flip 
in the logic path can be more harmful to the application because it changes the truth-table content 
of the affected LUT and thus alters the behavior of the circuit. This type of SEUs cannot be 
ameliorated in subsequent operations because the affected element is not written by the user 
application; thus, it must be explicitly re-written by reloading the correct CBS via scrubbing (3). 
Next, consider if radiation leads to pathways for electro-migration and accelerated aging effects 
[17]. This type of Local Permanent Damage (LPD) can be modeled as a stuck-at fault at one of 
the LUT inputs. Unfortunately, scrubbing techniques that rewrite the CBS contents will at best 
give up after a number of retries or at worst may usurp the mission, taking the device offline to 
repeatedly attempt to overwrite a permanent fault.  In that case, a permanent fault handling 
technique is required to circumvent the stuck-at faulty resource and thus repair the user 
application. 
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The self-configuration of spares via AS (4), aims to avoid the faulty resource by consecutively 
reconfiguring the faulty FE with design-time pre-seeded bitfiles, each of which exclusively 
avoids a set of LUTs in the physical FE area. By doing so, SMART searches the set of spares for 
one spare that can hide the fault by not using the broken LUT. Carrying spares is a common 
technique for fault-tolerance due to its simplicity and quickness, it is limited though to the 
number of carried spares, and cannot actually adapt at run-time to handle fault-scenarios that 
were not accounted for at design-time when the spares where configured. 
As a remedy, SMART adds one last-resort repair mechanism that is invoked when all other 
techniques fail to repair faults. This technique is the evolutionary OGA (5) repair that is not 
restricted by the number of spares or any other design-time considerations. Instead, it can 
heuristically search for alternative circuits that can bypass the faulty resource and thus produce 
the expected output. Such technique can sometimes be slow or unpredictable, but the fact that it 
is delayed to the very end of the repair cycle makes it a much better alternative to conceding to 
downgraded level of operation.  
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(SMART)
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Refurbishment through 
evolutionary repair  
Figure 1: High-level Operational View of SMART Repair Methods 
1.3.3. Evaluating Self-Regulation of Availability, Area, and Energy  
The first evaluation metric that we perform is reliability assessment of SMART compared to 
conventional TMR and scrubbing techniques that choose to ignore hard faults handling due to 
their rareness. To accomplish this, we model RARS as a Continuous-time Markov Chain 
(CTMC), providing transition probabilities of soft and hard fault rates based on publically 
available fault-measurement data, and soft and hard repair rates based on experimental results of 
SMART prototype. We present a full factorial experiment with nine levels based on three levels 
of each MTTF and MTTR of the hard faults, where each experiments consists of Monte Carlo 
simulations for the fault and repair levels to calculate various reliability and availability metrics 
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that can help shedding light on the significance of hard fault repair in fault-tolerance systems. 
Details on availability analysis using CTMC can be found in section 6.2.2. 
After we experimentally established the benefits of SMART on the availability of mission-
critical systems in space applications, we shifted the focus to assessing SMART‟s power and 
area considerations as a real engineering platform. For that, we used the standard BYU-LANL 
Triple Modular Redundancy (BL-TMR) [18] toolset to create triplicated designs of the image 
processing Sobel edge detector use case that we evaluated SMART against. The BL-TMR tool is 
a Java-based project that relies on the platform-independent Electronic Design Interchange 
Format (EDIF) [18] files to automatically insert redundancy, such as duplication and triplication, 
into digital designs. We chose four voter insertion options times seven voter insertion algorithms 
to design twenty eight BL-TMR triplicated edge detectors benchmarks. We used Xilinx mapping 
reports to extract the area overhead of each benchmark, and Xilinx Power Analyzer (XPA) [19] 
tool to calculate the dynamic power of the benchmarks. We then compared the twenty eight 
benchmarks to RARS in term of power and area to demonstrate the benefits of utilizing PR in 
FPGA-based fault-tolerance applications. The experimental setup and results are documented in 
section 6.3.2. 
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CHAPTER 2: RELATED WORK 
In this chapter, we present literature survey for previous works of the dissertation. The previous 
work is classified into technology related work and application related work, where the former 
deals with reconfigurable devices and their susceptibility to faults, while the latter focuses on the 
various fault-tolerance methods and their applications. 
2.1. Device Technology Related Work 
2.1.1. Role of Reconfigurable Devices in Space Mission-Critical Applications 
Hardware devices are commonly viewed as fixed-functionality devices as they are rendered for 
specific application at fabrication time and cannot be changed after that. However, the main 
benefit of FPGA devices is reconfigurability, as the fabrication will only create a programmable 
platform that can be configured -and often reconfigured- by the end user, to realize various 
functionalities at runtime. 
FPGAs are seas of programmable logic blocks that are highly interconnected through other 
programmable hierarchal communication switches. FPGAs can be made of anti-fuse technology, 
which allows single device programming, or SRAM cells that allows any number of device 
programming operations [6]. The focus of this dissertation is on SRAM-FPGAs because 
SMART relies on the reconfigurability feature to realize fault-tolerance with reduced power and 
area overhead. 
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SRAM-FPGA devices allow both logic and interconnect to be programmed by downloading a 
CBS that represents the desired circuit functionality. The generation of the CBS is normally 
automated through the usage of software tools, like Xilinx ISE pack [20], that read the design in 
schematic or Hardware Definition Languages (HDL) formats, and then transform the design into 
native bitfiles to program the target devices. Thus, FPGAs are considered a suitable platform for 
prototyping because they can be instantly programmed with the desired hardware functionality 
without going through the complicated, lengthy, process of fabrication in ASICs.  
Therefore, FPGA Devices have been widely used in space mission-critical applications for 
different purposes. For example, Europa mission [21] designers intend to use FPGA devices as a 
prototyping platform during the development phase, then based on a specially-designed flow, the 
prototype will be implemented on radiation-hardened ASIC devices for the actual mission 
deployment. Other missions will use FPGA devices in the actual deployment, whereas others are 
intended to test SRAM-FPGA resilience to SEU‟s.  Table 1 shows a list of actual space missions 
that utilize FPGAs in their operations, along with the deployment timeframe, and the intended 
use of the FPGAs. The various mission reported in the table demonstrate the important role of 
FPGA devices in such domain, and thus justify the direction toward fault-tolerance in FPGA in 
research and industry.  
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Table 1: Mission-Critical Space Applications Employing FPGA Devices 
Satellite Name 
Year 
Deployed 
Application 
FedSat (Australia - 
CRCSS) [22] 
2002 Remote Sensing: Control Logic, Classifier, Predictor, Encoder. 
Contains Actel FPGA for pre-filtering, Xilinx FPGA for data 
acquisition and synchronizations, another Xilinx FPGA device 
for data decoding. 
Cibola (USA-Los 
Alamos) [23]  
2007 Nine Xilinx Virtex FPGA devices  used for sensor-processing 
and SEU studies (soft faults monitoring and mitigation) 
SmartSat-1 (Japan – 
NICT) [24] 
2008 Seven XC2VP4 Xilinx FPGAs implementing 
Modulation/demodulation function (2 kbps -2 Mbps)  
Space-Based 
Reconfigurable 
Supercomputer [25]   
Future Xilinx Virtex-4, Atmel AT697 radiation-hardened, SPARC 
processor. Supercomputers that can achieve 1,000 GOPs, weigh 
40 pounds, and consume only 80 watts  
Venus Express [26] 2005-
2012 
Two radiation-hardened Xilinx Virtex-1 FPGA devices to 
implement Venus Monitoring Camera (VMC). 
NASA New Dawn [26] 2007-
2015 
Improved on Framing Cameras (VMC) that was used in Venus 
Mars Rover (JPL) [27] Many Xilinx Virtex FPGA has been used in DC motor controller in the 
rover 
 Europa [21] 2020-
2029 
FPGAs are used in prototyping, then the final design will be 
implemented on Rad-Hard ASIC devices for the actual mission  
ARTEMIS 
Reconfigurable Payload 
Processor (Responsive 
Space Missions) [28] 
 
Many RA-RCC (Reconfigurable Computers) using 3 Virtex-4 
(V4LX160) FPGAs 
  
2.1.2. Failure Modes and Their Effects  
Using FPGA devices comes at the expense of increased fault rate compared to ASIC-based 
devices. In the space environment, SRAM-based FPGAs can be affected by either radiation-
induced or aging-related faults [29].  Radiation-induced faults can be either non-destructive 
(soft) or destructive (hard). Aging Faults on the other hand are almost always destructive, which 
means that the fault cannot be recovered by rewriting the CBS. Regardless of the fault types, the 
application should be prepared to autonomously recover from the faults due to the limited human 
intervention in space missions. This section will provide taxonomy of the various fault types that 
can affect FPGA devices in space, and the common methods of dealing with them. 
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Radiation can cause one of the following two failure modes in FPFA devices [30]: 
1- Single Event Effect (SEE): Effect caused by single energetic sub-atomic particle strike, 
this is a random event that does not directly depend on cumulative effects. SEEs can 
result in two type of faults: 
a. Non-destructive SEU: This is a state-flip of an SRAM cell that is caused by the 
SEE [7]. It is non-destructive in the sense that the flipped bit can be restored by 
rewriting the cell‟s content with the correct value. SEUs can happen in the 
configuration logic or the user logic. The configuration logic is what defines the 
FPGA circuit behavior; the only way to correct SEUs in this logic is to rewrite the 
flipped cell with a new value via scrubbing. However, SEUs in the user logic fall 
on the datapath, and thus can be corrected by subsequent writes to the same user 
register. 
b. Destructive Single Event Latch-up (SEL): Occurs when an energetic charged 
particle causes excessive supply power to destruct the memory cell [30]. This 
destruction is permanent and cannot be restored by rewriting the CBS like in the 
previous SEU case. 
2- Total Ionizing Dose (TID): Cumulative damage caused by protons and electrons hitting 
the silicon substrate for long times. TIDs are almost always destructive. 
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To Summarize, radiation can cause destructive faults through TID faults or SEEs that get 
manifested as SELs. More commonly, radiation will cause non-destructive SEEs in the forms of 
SEUs. 
Numerous fault-tolerance systems in the literature have neglected permanent fault handling in 
FPGA devices [31]. The reason behind this choice is that many resources in research and 
industry have claimed that Xilinx SRAM-based FPGAs are immune to radiation-induced 
destructive hard faults. No SEL was reported during experiments when SRAM-based FPGAs 
were exposed to the maximum tested Linear Energy Transfer (LET) of tens of MeV cm
2
/mg 
[29]. Xilinx Virtex family was also found immune against TID effect of up to 300 krad in [32]. 
Moreover, The introduction of epitaxial CMOS fabrication process in Virtex devices resulted in 
TID immunity of >100 krad and SEL immunity of LET > 120 MeV cm
2
/mg [33].  
Therefore, conventional fault-tolerance approaches targeting SRAM-based FPGA devices in 
space applications have disregarded hard-faults tolerance [31]. Instead, they focused on 
mitigating SEU faults in the data path using redundancy techniques, such as TMR, to mask the 
transient effect of the user registers bit flips [34], and implementing scrubbing techniques to 
overwrite SEUs in the configuration logic [35]. Xilinx devices have shown high tolerance to SEL 
and TID, thus SEU remains as the main concern in space-mission that use FPGA devices [33]. 
Nonetheless, in this work, we contradict the aforementioned mainstream hypothesis by asserting 
that permanent faults cannot be ignored in mission-critical applications because of the following 
reasons: 
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1. With the continuous effort to shrink the feature size in VLSI devices, the impact of aging-
related (wear out) faults such as Time-Dependent Dielectric Breakdown (TDDB) will 
significantly increase to levels that cannot be ignored [36]. TDDB depends on the 
operating temperature of the device, and the gate oxide thickness that shrinks with 
smaller process technologies. The charge trapped in the thin oxide layer keeps increasing 
until it reaches the threshold of breakdown; this effect is imminent for aggressively 
scaled technologies operating in thermally stressful environments. The resulting fault is 
destructive, meaning that the SRAM cell cannot be reconfigured to amend the fault 
effect.   
2. Local Permanent Damage (LPD) is reported by [17]  due to SELs or SEUs that cannot be 
corrected without system reset. This type of LPDs is manifested as hard faults in systems 
that cannot tolerate full system restart. 
3. Radiation testing is not guaranteed to exactly replicate space environment. Also no FPGA 
has been tested for more than 15 years, whereas space mission can go for more than that 
[17] 
4. Xilinx publicly reports that TDDB can start to happen in as little as 3 years in an XC3S 
4000/5000 90-nm SRAM-based FPGA devices under a temperature of 125C [37]. 
5. Recently published work  reported TDDB impacting 10% of total LUTs every year [36] 
in aggressive thermal conditions, based on Xilinx data referenced above. Other recently 
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published work reported TDDB MTTF  of 476 days for a 2206-slice circuit on 150nm 
technology [29].  
Therefore, we believe that it is not the best engineering practice to blindly ignore hard faults 
especially in multi-million mission-critical applications that needs to be equipped with inherent 
tolerance to any type of destructive events. Thus, we present the design and implementation of a 
generic autonomous fault-tolerance system that can handle both soft and hard faults, followed by 
evaluation metrics to demonstrate the benefits of such system compared to conventional TMR 
and scrubbing systems, in term of availability, power, and area 
2.2. Application Related Work 
This section surveys previous researches that present various fault-tolerance methods, successful 
prototypes and implementations of OC systems, and the application of GA as a repair method.  
2.2.1. Fault Tolerance in Reconfigurable Devices 
FPGAs are popular platforms for reconfigurable computing applications especially pertaining to 
the field of embedded systems  [38]. Run-time partial reconfiguration has many advantages, such 
as time-multiplexing different functionality designs to save power and resources without losing 
the basic functionality of the application [39, 40], and supporting adaptive architectures that 
scales based on resources availability and mission requirements to achieve improved algorithm 
performance while reducing power consumption [41]. 
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The ability to perform partial reconfiguration for local and remote system has opened new 
domains in fault-tolerant hardware designs, especially for space applications [6]. These 
applications are susceptible to faults due to the harsh operating environments along with 
difficult, if not impossible, human intervention. Thus, runtime partial reconfiguration has been 
successfully utilized to autonomously repair faulty systems, and compensate for the absence of 
human intervention. 
One of the most common techniques for mitigating unwanted configuration memory changes is 
scrubbing [17, 42]. Scrubbing involves overwriting of the configuration memory at periodic 
intervals with a configuration that is known to be fault-free. Moreover, this process can be 
augmented by reading back the configuration memory and comparing it with a configuration that 
is known to be good to isolate the erroneous frame(s) so that they can be re-written using PR. 
Scrubbing techniques fail when the stored configuration is damaged or when the fault is caused 
by permanent hardware resource failures, in which case more elaborate repair techniques 
targeting permanent faults are needed, such as the evolutionary repair algorithm presented in [15] 
and in this work. 
Table 2 presents a comparison between SMART and other prominent fault-tolerance techniques. 
All surveyed techniques, except conventional TMR, employ some form of fault recovery 
mechanism to restore the original fault-free system status. TMR is a passive technique which 
employs spatial voting to mask the faults. The area and power overhead for the TMR approach is 
three times the area and power overhead associated with a single module (OFE) plus the overhead 
associated with the voting logic (OV). 
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Table 2: Comparison between SMART and Other Prominent Fault-Tolerance Approaches 
Approach 
Fault Handling 
Method 
Fault Detection Resource Coverage 
Power overhead 
Area cost Latency 
Hard 
faults 
Logic 
 
Comparator 
TMR Spatial Voting Negligible No Yes No 3*OFE + OV 
Vigander 
[14] 
Spatial voting and 
offline evolutionary 
refurbishment 
Negligible No Yes No 3*OFE + OV + OGA 
Lach [43] 
Design-time fine 
grain redundancy 
based reconfiguration 
Not 
addressed 
No Yes 
Not 
addressed 
Fault detection 
mechanism is not 
addressed 
STARS 
[44] 
Online BIST 
Depends 
on 
geometry 
of device 
Yes Yes Yes 
OFE + 
Reconfiguration 
controller 
Garvie [17] 
Spatial Voting and 
online (1+1) ES 
Negligible Yes Yes No 3*OFE + OV + OGA 
Keymeulen 
[45] 
Design-time 
population based 
fault insensitive 
designs 
Not 
addressed 
No Yes 
Not 
addressed 
Fault detection 
mechanism is not 
addressed 
SMART 
Adaptive 
redundancy, 
diversity-based 
configurations, OGA 
Negligible Yes Yes No 
Analyzed in Section 
6.3 
 
Vigander [14] presents an offline genetic algorithm refurbishment technique to handle hard 
faults. All the modules are simulated with faults representing a worst-case scenario, and the 
evolution-based refurbishment is performed on all three modules for recovery. The overhead 
associated with the GA based repair is represented as OGA. This cost can be used to include all 
GA based control mechanisms, and the spare resource allocated for the GA-based refurbishment.  
Lach [43] on the other hand presents a technique based on design-time allocation of fine-grain 
spares at the Configurable Logic Blocks (CLB) level. One CLB is allocated as spare for a design-
time defined group of CLBs, and multiple configurations are generated such that one fault can be 
tolerated in each group. Average Area overhead of the chosen benchmarks is 5.4%, which is 
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considerably less than the TMR. This scheme however does not include any fault detection 
mechanism. 
STARS [44] employs run-time Built-In Self Testing (BIST) by roving across the FPGA fabric. 
This technique covers fault detection, isolation and repair with minimal application area 
overhead. Dynamic PR has also been used in this approach to facilitate downloading the tested 
regions onto the fabric. Still, the time to detect a fault can be quiet high and as much as 8.5M 
erroneous outputs may be produced before being able to detect the fault [46]. Further, the fault 
detection process employs continuous reconfiguration and thus incurs huge power overhead, and 
potentially causes performance degradation due to clock stoppage, even when the system is fault-
free. 
Garvie [17] employs spatial TMR for masking the fault and an evolutionary strategy to refurbish 
the identified faulty module. The power and area overhead of this technique can be essentially 
considered same as that of TMR. The work concludes that hard-fault tolerance is essential for 
fault-tolerance of FPGA devices in harsh-environment deployments. 
Keymeulen [45] introduces an evolutionary-based method to generate a population of individuals 
at design time that are resilient to a set of predetermined type of faults according to the planned 
mission. This design-time process is tested by employing the design-time generated 
configurations to overcome the expected fault pattern at run-time. This scheme requires 
accommodating all possible faults at design-time. 
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2.2.2. Organic Computing Approaches 
Related works in the literature have explored techniques useful for the development of an OC 
system from various theoretical and practical perspectives. A frequent focus among these has 
been the design of OC architectures and development methodologies for systems with the 
potential to exhibit increased reliability and sustainability.  
For example, in [47], the run-time reliability of System-on-a-Chip (SoC) architectures was 
evaluated. The objective was to design SoCs that can adapt to environmental changes and 
unpredictable failure scenarios by introducing dynamic reliability, power management, and 
security tradeoffs. The implementation included five-stage RISC pipeline architecture with 
globally-accessible error counters in fixed time intervals. This technique addressed self-
monitoring in SoC applications with redundant parts; we expand on this by presenting a novel 
OC system that not only provides self-monitoring capability, but also self-repair and self-
adaptation for increased reliability yet with reduced power consumption than conventional 
redundancy techniques. 
In [48], an Observer/Controller architecture was developed to provide a generic template to 
design control architectures for OC systems without extension to a hardware prototype 
implementation. This organic framework mainly targeted self-organization in a simulated 
environment and recommended thorough empirical studies of OC systems in different 
application domains. We extend on these concepts and investigate more self-x properties in real-
life application of an edge detection circuit running in error-prone environments.   
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In [49], an organic computing paradigm called “marching-pixels” targeting future CMOS camera 
chips is presented. This paradigm relies on a massive fine-grain processor array to autonomously 
execute image pre-processing tasks, such as center detection and the tracking of moving objects. 
The organic concept stems from the fact that each pixel that falls on the detection path (e.g., 
edge, center, moving object, and so on) can be the origin or birth of a virtual organic object, 
which can then travel through a grid of identical PEs where it may die or join other pixels. The 
C-based simulator used to demonstrate “marching-pixels” confirmed the emergence of self-
organization and self-healing in software simulated CMOS environment.  
In [5], the role of middleware that acts between the hardware system and the application software 
is discussed for OC systems based on dynamically reconfigurable FPGAs. A scalable data flow-
driven virtual machine (SDVM) is introduced. It is able to schedule parallel computing 
assignments to a set of reconfigurable and heterogeneous processing elements on a FPGA. The 
middleware is also able to dynamically balance the workload of the entire system in order to 
optimize power management and cope with faults. To demonstrate the advantages of SDVM, the 
Romberg numerical integration algorithm is implemented on the FPGA where the soft cores are 
used as processing elements. The results show the speedups achieved by executing the task on a 
variable number of processing elements as allocated by the middleware; a comparison is 
conducted with respect to sequential execution. Furthermore, self-organization and self-
optimization are investigated in the experimental work, with less emphasize on self-repair due to 
the nature of the application. SMART on the other hand targets hardware sustainability in 
mission critical applications; with the main emphasize being self-repair and self-optimization of 
power consumption. 
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In robotic applications a control architecture for a robot based on organic computing principles is 
presented in [50]. Decentralized control is shown to achieve the global objective of movement 
for a six-legged platform. The platform is also able to manage the failure of a node through its 
local rules and demonstrate sustainability in a mechanical environment. 
More generally, in [51], Digital on-demand Computing Organism (DoDOrg) targeting real-time 
systems is presented. The system model is based on biological principles to achieve the desired 
self-x properties; it is divided into processing cells representing human cell analogs, middleware 
control representing organ analogs, and high-level control representing brain analog. The system 
is based on heterogeneous mix of computing elements, including standard elements such as 
CPUs and reconfigurable cells. The work presents an approach to organic computing that shows 
many of its desired self-x properties along with power management demonstrated using a robot-
controller example. While the viability of this system is shown in a simulated environment, the 
transfer to a real robot system is sought in a later phase. In our work, we aspire from and extend 
on the significant self-x properties demonstrated in DoDOrg robot simulation by using an actual 
FPGA implementation of edge detection circuit, where the OC paradigm demonstrates power-
conservative fault-tolerance through adaptive redundancy and software monitoring and 
refurbishment of the reconfigurable logic. 
In an attempt to practically realize DoDOrg on FPGAs, a framework to achieve a decentralized 
configuration and power management scheme is shown in [4]. This work considers FPGAs as 
the most viable computing platform for OC systems due to the enormous benefits of 
reconfigurability. However, the work identifies the centralized nature of the FPGA‟s ICAP as the 
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main contradiction to the crucial decentralized requirement of OC systems. Therefore, a platform 
in which each computing node can autonomously and independently request its reconfiguration 
through the ICAP is presented. Similarly, power consumption is managed individually by each 
node at run-time to attain the desired virtual decentralization of the ICAP. Though this work does 
not present a complete implementation of an OC system, it does point toward the idea that 
FPGAs can serve as a viable computing platform for these systems. In the experimental setup, 
each computing node is autonomously and independently able to request its reconfiguration 
through the ICAP. Similarly, power consumption is managed individually by each node at run-
time. 
2.2.3. Genetic Algorithm Techniques 
Evolutionary Algorithms are a family of intelligent, heuristic, search algorithms that are inspired 
by the Darwinian theory of natural evolution. Darwin‟s famous theory about the natural selection 
of the fittest individuals and the recombination of their genetic material to produce yet better 
individuals is imitated in the evolutionary algorithms. 
2.2.3.1.Standard GA Techniques 
One of the widely used types of evolutionary algorithms is the Genetic Algorithm (GA). GA is an 
adaptive heuristic search based on initial set of individuals, called population; the selection 
process favors a subset of this population that shows better fitness according to a predefined 
function called the fitness function. This function must accurately quantify what a good solution 
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is for the problem in hand. Each individual is encoded into a genetic representation of the 
solution, called chromosome, which contain one or many blocks, each called a gene, which 
encodes a single physical trait of the individual. Once the fittest individuals in a generation are 
selected based on their fitness function, a set of genetic operators are applied on them to produce 
different chromosomes that might yield better solutions. The Genetic operators vary in their 
nature and usage, but two of them are used in almost all GA implementations, namely crossover 
and mutation. 
Crossover is the recombination of genetic material to produce new chromosomes; the content of 
the genetic material is preserved, but only shuffled probabilistically hoping that this reshuffling 
could lead to the juxtaposition of some genes in such a way to increase the fitness of the 
offspring. Mutation on the other hand, is a probabilistic change in the chromosome to introduce 
new traits, this is similar to mutations in nature which produces better or worse individuals, but 
under any case, the selection pressure can pick the useful mutations and ignore the harmful ones 
by measuring the mutation impact on each individual.  
Once the selected individuals are genetically operated, they get replaced into the population and 
another round of the algorithm is executed. In general, this approach is shown to converge into 
better fit solutions, based on the exploitation of the selection process and the exploration of the 
genetic operators. 
Figure 2 depicts the GA process in a flow chart. The power of GA comes from the contradicting 
forces of exploitation and exploration [52]; the GA exploits the best solutions by picking them in 
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the selection process which favors the fittest individuals, then explores these selected solutions 
by recombining their genetic material and introducing limited randomness into them, in order to 
produce more diversity into the population. 
Generation of initial population
Selection of the fittest 
individuals
Fitness evaluation based on 
the fitness function
Recombination of selected 
individuals (Crossover)
Mutation of selected 
individuals
Placement of offspring into 
new generation
Termination criteria 
met?
N
O
Get solution
Selection Process: GA’s 
way of exploiting the fit 
individuals in the search 
process
GA operators: Exploring 
new solutions derived form 
the best individuals in the 
population
YES
 
Figure 2: Genetic Algorithm Flow Chart 
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There are two paradigms for implementing GA in reconfigurable applications: Extrinsic 
evolution via functional models that abstract the physical aspects of the real device, and intrinsic 
evolution on the actual devices. It is evident that extrinsic approaches simplify the evolution 
process as they operate on software models of the FPGAs. 
For applications like fault handling in deep space missions, not all fault types can be readily 
accommodated by software models. Additionally, abstracting the physical aspects of the target 
device complicates rendering the final designs into actual on-board circuits, for instance, 
limitations such as routability of the design cannot be ensured until the final stages of the 
configuration process. For these reasons, intrinsic evolution can provide a direct approach to 
realizing physical designs for a specific FPGA device. 
Several previous research efforts have addressed intrinsic evolution. A successful attempt on 
Field Programmable Transistor Array (FPTA) chips was implemented by [53]. FPTAs are 
transistor-level programmable devices configured by controlling the status of programmable 
switches interconnecting array of transistors. The work proposed new ideas for long-term 
hardware reliability using evolvable hardware techniques via an evolutionary design tool, called 
EHWPack, which facilitates intrinsic evolution by incorporating PGAPack genetic engine with 
Labview test-bed running on UNIX workstation. Digital XNOR Gate on two connected FPTA 
boards was intrinsically evolved.  
Miller [54] addressed the importance of direct evolution on the Xilinx 6216 FPGA devices; the 
research explored the effect of the device physical constraints on evolving digital circuits. A 
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mapping between the representation genotype and the device phenotype was proposed, however, 
no implementation details were presented. 
In [55], a Multilayer Runtime Reconfiguration Architecture (MRRA) framework illustrates the 
concept of a communication and reconfiguration interface with an embedded System-on-Chip 
(SoC). This modular architecture has a hierarchical framework to support different functionalities 
as each functional layer can do its job independently of other working layers. It provides the 
logic, translation and reconfiguration layers with standardized interfaces for communication 
between these layers and the FPGA-based SoC. The bitstream was directly manipulated to 
efficiently realize different logic by modifying the content and/or reallocating the LUTs. 
SMART uses an enhanced version of MRRA based intrinsic evolution platform and introduces 
direct bitstream manipulation for Xilinx Virtex 4 devices as compared to Xilinx Virtex II Pro 
devices. 
In this work, we test SMART using Sobel edge-detection algorithm on reconfigurable logic. 
There are various applications of edge-detection with main emphasis on identifying boundaries 
in an image; it is used for object recognition and quality monitoring in industrial applications, 
medical imaging applications such as magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) , Ultrasound [56] and 
it is used for satellite imaging applications [57]. Numerous efforts have been made to accelerate 
this computationally expensive algorithm on specialized hardware using conventional design 
techniques [58-61]. Research has also been done on designing edge-detectors using evolutionary 
techniques [56, 62, 63]. A comparison between SMART edge-detection evolution results and the 
other edge-detection evolution techniques is shown in Table 11. 
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2.2.3.2.Parallel GA Techniques 
Traditional GA techniques have demonstrated outstanding capabilities in solving complex 
optimization problem since their introduction back in the 1970‟s. However, engineering and 
scientific applications have increasingly grown in complexity and criticality, demanding better 
solutions yet within strict optimization constraints such as time, cost, and power. For that, the 
research community targeted improving the GA performance in order to suit the nature of these 
complex mission critical applications. The most noticeable effort to improve on the SGA is the 
introduction of Parallel Genetic Algorithms (PGA). 
PGA adopts a divide-and-conquer approach to split the problems into pieces and thus exploits 
multiple processors to enhance the convergence time [64]. Among the many PGA subclasses that 
have emerged, Island-Based Genetic Algorithm (IGA) has been heavily studied and implemented 
in various scholar and practical domains.  
IGA consists of several semi-isolated islands or demes, each of which hosts an independent GA 
implementation that runs in parallel with other demes‟ GAs. The islands exchange individuals 
from time to time in an effort to increase the chance of finding a better global solution. The IGA 
can apply global parameters, such as mutation rate, crossover rate, population size, to all islands 
or vary them across islands. IGA introduces new set of parameters such as the number of islands, 
the island topology, the migration rate, and the migration policy. Even though IGA appears to be 
a straight juxtaposition of many simple GA runs, the emergent behavior caused by speciation and 
migration entirely suits the organic theme of the OGA that we presented in this work. 
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The benefits of the IGA are many; some of them are listed below: 
1- Understandability and Inherent Technical Support: IGA is the most popular approach 
among all PGA types [64]. This is partly attributed to the relative ease of this approach 
and its compatibility with the coarse-grain parallel computing paradigm. 
2- Speedup and Quality of Solution: Many research efforts have shown the advantage of 
using IGA over SGA and other Parallel GA approaches [65-73]  
3- More Diversified Population: Spatial distribution of individuals across multiple islands 
and allowing them to interact only through limited migrations will effectively reduce the 
chance that the best individuals take over the population rapidly and direct the GA toward 
local optima in the early stages of the search [74] 
4- Closer Analogy to Natural Evolution: Although not necessarily an advantage, some 
advocates of the biological inspiration of computation algorithms believe that IGA 
represents a closer analogy to natural evolution, where the population is seldom a 
panmictic one; there are usually many niches that evolve separately and occasionally 
exchange individuals. [75] 
5- Scalability and parallel-computation suitability: The effectiveness of IGA comes from the 
fact that the inter-process communication is minimal and only limited to the migration 
phase. Other Parallel GA paradigms, like a master-slave GA that distributes the selection 
knowledge [76], require heavy communication between the nodes in order to pick the 
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fittest among the entire population, this is not a problem in IGA as the selection process 
is limited to each island‟s subpopulation, the only time inter-process communication 
happens  is when the individuals migrate, an event that sparsely occur in a traditional 
IGA (1% of population every 1 generation is a common choice [72]) 
6- Linearly separable problems and multi-objective optimization: The fact that 
subpopulations are evolved independently causes different islands to climb different 
peaks in the search space, provided that the migration rate is not too high to cause 
premature convergence for all islands. This finding amplifies the importance of IGA as it 
makes it a good candidate for achieving multi-objective optimizations, which are widely 
encountered in many scientific and engineering fields [77] 
Examples of successful applications of IGA are shown in Table 3 below. 
Table 3: Successful Applications of IGA 
Application Reference 
Database search using PGA [78] 
Nuclear reactor optimization [70] [69] 
Travelling Salesman  [79] 
Royal Road functions (R1-R4) [72] 
DeJong test suites [67],  Goldberg, Korb, and Deb‟s ugly 3-bit deceptive problem 
[71], and the zero-one knapsack problem [68]. 
[66] 
Total of eight functions: 
Four functions (IM1-IM4) are specially created to test properties of IGA; three of 
them require that islands cooperate to find a good solution. 
The remaining four are standard multimodal test functions, which are: 
Rosenbrock, Schwefel, Astrigin, and Griewangk. 
[80] 
Optimal design of elastic flywheels  [81] 
Optimization fine spatial grid of water pipes for groundwater remediation (pump-
and-treat technology) 
[82] 
Training a Recurrent Artificial Neural Network (RANN). [83] 
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CHAPTER 3:   SMART DESIGN OBJECTIVES  
In this section, we present the major design objectives of SMART. Each of these objectives, 
listed in Table 4, is analyzed in terms of motivation and how it has been approached in other 
studies; we then show the design decisions that each goal has prompted and how these decisions 
were manifested in the actual system design.  
Table 4: System Goals, Motivations, and Impacts 
Objective Motivation Impact on Design 
Exploit 
Reconfigurability to 
Realize Adaptive Level 
of Redundancy 
tradeoff between reliability and overhead,  
Incorporate run-time info in redundancy 
decisions, make use of the reconfigurability of 
the FPGA as an adaptation technique  
RARS, Dynamic PR 
Develop Organically 
Amenable Hard-Fault 
Repair Techniques 
Account for hard-fault possibilities in space 
missions, Exploit reconfigurability to advance 
organic behavior, Utilize Evolutionary 
Algorithms in the OC domain. 
OGA, decoding Virtex-
4 CBS, AS, efficient 
use of Xilinx Tools 
 
Implement SMART and 
Evaluate it Using Widely 
Accepted Metrics 
Discover and Mitigate difficulties in 
implementing real OCs,  provide test-bed for 
future research, properly evaluate SMART 
against standard metrics 
Sobel edge detector, 
JTAG, GNAT, Verilog, 
JAVA GUI, CTMC, 
BL-TMR 
3.1. Exploit Reconfigurability to Realize Adaptive Level of Redundancy 
Traditional reliability techniques often rely on the concept of redundancy. Redundancy is the 
addition of resources, time and/or information beyond what is actually needed for normal system 
operation in order to maintain functionality and performance when faults occur. The tradeoff 
between overhead and reliability in redundant systems has been the focal interest of many 
research efforts in the past few decades [6]. Consequently, many redundancy schemes have 
emerged to support different reliability requirements. Some of the influential redundancy 
schemes are as follows.  
37 
 
1. TMR: This is a passive redundancy scheme that masks faults as they occur without 
isolating the faulty parts. TMR consists of three functionally-identical modules that 
perform the same task in tandem and a voter that outputs the majority vote of the three 
modules [84]. If one module fails, the other two can still overrule its erroneous output 
and maintain correct overall TMR output. 
2. Duplex Configuration: Consists of two functional modules and a discrepancy detector 
that keeps track of any discrepancy between the outputs of the modules. The system 
should be able to tolerate a period of degraded operation until the fault is isolated and 
recovered by other means. 
3. Stand-by Sparing. In this system, one module drives the system operation, while the 
others are hot spares in an idle state that are ready to be called into action. Cold spares, in 
contrast, are kept shut down and thus do not consume power, but they do incur some 
delay upon activation before they are able to replace the faulty module. 
The tradeoff in all of these fault-handling systems is between increased system dependability and 
the overhead associated with maintaining redundant parts. For instance, duplex systems maintain 
one redundant element but cannot mask faults on the fly. Adding one module to a duplex system 
makes it capable of masking faults via TMR techniques at the expense of extra area, power, and 
cost. This compromise is usually hard to achieve at design time. Thus, a mission-level analysis is 
used to determine appropriate tradeoffs. 
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In addition, mission-critical applications are impacted by many parameters, some of which can 
only be decided at run time. For example, an edge detector circuit is of extreme importance when 
it is operating on a critical video stream, for example, of a moving object in a surveillance 
recording; in these cases, it is usually necessary to quickly mask any faults that might occur 
because any loss of detection capabilities is intolerable and can affect the overall mission 
objectives. However, if the same edge detector is operating on a still scene in a surveillance 
recording, then it might be possible for the system to tolerate some degradation in the output 
because the generated image can still be analyzed later or simply omitted due to the lack of 
action in the scene. TMR may be a wise choice in the former case, whereas a duplex 
configuration might be a better option in the latter. This scenario is an example of a system that 
shows changing reliability needs at different mission stages. 
Whereas many other studies have constant redundancy level in their systems at design time [12, 
34, 85-87], we sought an adaptive solution by deferring the decision regarding which level of 
redundancy to support until the run time. Thus, the choice can be enhanced by mission-related 
information and status to make it an efficient compromise between the desired reliability and the 
associated overhead in terms of cost, size, power, and area. To facilitate this approach, we 
implanted RARS with various innate levels of redundancy from which the AE can select at run 
time based on the mission status and the desired reliability level.  
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3.2. Develop Organically Amenable Hard-Fault Repair Techniques 
OC research is usually more concerned about spotting and controlling the emergence of self-x 
properties than emphasizing the underlying platforms and implementation details. Therefore, one 
should question whether FPGAs are suitable platforms for hosting organic computing systems, 
and if so, to what extent. We believe that these are fundamental questions that must be answered 
to assert the validity of choosing FPGAs as the hosting platform for an OC system. 
In Section 1.2, we listed seven reasons that justify the selection of FPGAs as a hosting platform 
for SMART. Mainly, due to the ability to change the hardware realization of the system at any 
point of time, we were able to add and remove hardware components to adapt for changing 
mission requirements and fault scenarios, this feature would not be attainable on a fixed 
hardware device like ASICs. 
Guarding mission-critical systems against faults has been a major research and industry focus in 
the past few decades [6]. Nevertheless, the extreme majority of these efforts have overlooked 
hard-fault repair on the basis that new technological advancements have produced device 
technologies that are immune to radiation-induced faults [33], overlooking the increased impact 
of device scaling toward smaller technology nodes (sub 90nm) on the aging-related failure 
modes. We have listed five reasons in Section 2.1.2 to rationalize our choice of considering hard 
faults in SMART‟s repair techniques. 
Therefore, a key SMART design objective is to exploit the reconfigurability feature of FPGA to 
implement organically-amenable hard-fault repair techniques that can help extending the 
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operational lifetime of mission-critical systems. These two techniques are the Amorphous Spares 
(AS) and the Organic GA (OGA). 
The AS concept stems from the fact that a spare for FPGA circuit implementation is nothing but 
a reasonably-sized bitstream file, this is in contrast to carrying an actual hard spare that occupies 
space and require dedicated swapping mechanism to replace faulty parts. AS on the other hand 
only requires re-implementing the same hardware design by using different area constraints per 
intended spare. The ability of PowerPC embedded processor to reconfigure the FPGA using the 
ICAP makes the swapping mechanism a software-driven process. The next stage of AS is to 
allow dynamic relocation of the bitstream to avoid suspected faulty resources in the FPGA 
during the mission runtime. 
The second organic technique to deal with hard-faults is the OGA. The GA is a non-deterministic 
heuristic search that can lead to slow and partial convergence. In order to make SMART GA an 
organically-amenable one, we narrowed down three aspects that stand in the way of 
implementing a GA that is appropriate for an organic system comprised of reconfigurable 
devices. These three aspects are fitness evaluation, genetic representation, and design of fitness 
function.  We devised solutions that can help realize the organic GA objective as follows. 
1. Genetic representation: The process of encoding the physical traits of the application 
(phenotype) into digital representations (genotype), and vice versa: decoding back the 
digital representations into physical form. This selection can complicate the evolution 
process as it is needed every time an individual is evaluated. The genetic operators are 
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applied in a computer program that requires string or integer representation of the 
individuals (called chromosomes), but the intrinsic fitness evaluation requires the 
individual to be implemented as a physical circuit on the FPGA. SMART uses direct 
bitstream evolution to solve this problem, where the most compact and innate 
representation of the circuit, the CBS, is directly evolved by the OGA. This process is 
described in details in Section 4.2.3.2. 
2. Fitness evaluation: This is the process of measuring the fitness of the evolved individual. 
The common technique is to model the hardware device and use the software model to 
evaluate the fitness, this is called extrinsic fitness evaluation [14]. This method poses risk 
of imprecise modeling especially with the complexities of capturing timing and physical 
constraints. Relying on simulators of the hardware rather than the hardware itself is a 
risky approach for mission-critical systems because the evolved solution in not 
guaranteed to fit on the actual hardware. Thus, the OGA utilizes intrinsic fitness 
evaluation method that employs the actual hardware in measuring the fitness of the 
individuals. This technique will be described in Section 4.2.3.2. 
3. Fitness function: GAs are inspired by Charles Darwin‟s theory of natural selection, which 
is usually reduced to the motto “survival of the fittest”. In reality, nature is capable of 
determining the fitness of individuals by assessing their success in reaching natural 
resources, evading predators, and ultimately mating and reproducing. However, in 
artificial evolution, determining the “fitness” of individuals is normally done using a 
fitness function that measures the desired traits of the evolved individuals and quantifies 
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them into numerical values. Having a representative fitness function is of great 
importance to the GA success. In addition, it impacts the portability of the GA to other 
problem domains. For instance, a fitness function to quantify the adherence of a frame to 
certain edge-detection criteria will not fit a GA that aims to reduce noise in a 
communication channel. Therefore, the OGA is equipped with a model-free, application-
independent fitness function that relies on measuring the deviation between any evolved 
individual and a known-to-be-good one. More details about the OGA‟s discrepancy-
based fitness function is presented in Section 4.2.3.3  
3.3. Implement SMART and Evaluate it Using Widely Accepted Metrics 
In this work, not only we develop and oversee an approach to promote self-repair with reduced 
power consumption compared to traditional approaches, but we also synthesize the solution and 
evaluate its performance in a realistic application running on intrinsic hardware configuration. 
The ever-increasing complexities of computing systems require new original design paradigms. 
Organic computing is one paradigm that restrains this complexity by allowing more freedom to 
the system to improvise solutions at run time. The inherent authority of the system over its own 
operation is usually manifested by the emergence of properties at the system level that can hardly 
be noticed at the component level. These properties may be useful or harmful to the system's 
operation. The design goal of any OC system is to subdue the emergence of harmful properties 
while promoting helpful ones. The controlled emergence of life-like, self-x properties is what 
distinguishes OCs from other design paradigms. Rather than manually providing all alternative 
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execution paths at design time, the system is equipped with innate capability to actuate desired 
configurations based on the sensory information that it acquires, making it capable of adapting to 
handle many execution scenarios. 
Whereas many OCs in literature were either conceptually prototyped or limitedly simulated, 
SMART has been fully implemented and its benefits are demonstrated quantitatively in action 
[88]. To place the system into a real-life context, we implemented real-time video edge detection 
using a 2-D gradient-based Sobel edge detection algorithm. Table 5 shows the different modules 
in the system along with the underlying technology that is used to implement them. The details 
on each module are presented in Section 5.1. 
Table 5: System Modules Implementation Details 
Module Implementation Platform 
Organic layer ML402 mother board (lower board of Xilinx Video Starter Kit) with 
Virtex-4 FPGA (XCV4SX35)  
Video 
capturing/buffering 
Video IO Daughter Card (VIODC) 
(Upper board of Xilinx Video Starter Kit) with Virtex-2 PRO FPGA 
XCV2P7 
HW-SW connection JTAG from FPGA side 
Xilinx Parallel port host PC 
GNAT to interface with the FEs  
Comm. Manager Multi-threaded C++ application  
Human Interface 
Module (HIM) 
C++ encoder/decoder that accesses the file system 
Software monitor Java-based application (Figure 5) 
Application Sobel edge detector (Verilog) 
GA engine C++ based Standard GA [15] 
OGA interface C-based API (MRRA) [55] 
 
Moreover, the experimental work has been expanded to evaluate SMART‟s advantages against 
widely-accepted benchmarks. First, the availability of SMART and the industry standard TMR 
44 
 
techniques were simulated through CTMC under the conditions of nine realistic space mission 
use cases. All used numbers and parameters were acquired from either public resources or 
experimental results of SMART operation. The simulation‟s merit was to abandon analytical and 
steady-state reliability results in order to attain practical prediction of the nine use cases. The 
results of these simulations are presented in Section 6.2. 
Finally, whereas many works in the literature evaluated their systems against an assumed TMR 
overhead of three times the FE overhead plus the voter overhead, we opted to employ special 
tools to insert triplication in a design while maintaining efficient power, area, availability, and 
timing standards. We used BL-TMR [18] tools to generate optimized triplicated FEs, in order to 
gain more precise and unbiased comparison to SMART. The details of the evaluation methods 
that were used are listed in Section 6.3. 
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CHAPTER 4: A SMART ARCHITECTURE FOR MISSION-CRITICAL 
SYSTEMS 
Figure 3 depicts the detailed architecture of the lab prototype of SMART. In this prototype, the 
software-based repair layer is implemented on a host PC to aid in experiments and validation. 
The deployment system is intended to have the software components implemented in an 
embedded PowerPC processor that comes with many commercially-available Xilinx FPGA 
boards.  
The lower half of the figure shows the organic hardware layer where one or more FPGA boards 
can be accommodated in the system, each of which has one or more RARS module(s). The 
RARS modules are connected via a dispatcher module, which facilitates the communication with 
the software layer. This communication takes place through a JTAG interface on the FPGA side 
to a parallel port on the host PC side via a Xilinx parallel cable. The software layer 
communicates with the hardware through a multi-threaded communication manager, which is 
responsible for abstracting all hardware complexities and providing messages to the various 
software components. These components include the Human Interface Module (HIM), which 
converts the binary message into human-readable text files, and vice versa. They also include the 
repair modules, which are the scrubber and the OGA repair that will be thoroughly described in 
upcoming sections. 
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Figure 3: SMART Top-level Hardware and Software Architecture 
 
4.1. RARS Hardware Layer 
The hardware layer consists of one or more RARSs and dispatchers configured on one or more 
FPGA boards. The RARS module comprises the smallest integrated unit in the hardware 
platform; it consists of one AE and three identical FEs. The AE is application-independent; it 
contains the logic that drives the organic behavior by actively reorganizing the available FEs. On 
the other hand, the FEs represents the application-dependent user implementation of the desired 
functionality. Therefore, the FEs are the only modules that need to be modified for the system to 
support new applications. 
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Having three FEs in each RARS module illustrates the common practice of employing a TMR 
configuration in redundancy-based fault-tolerant systems. Nonetheless, there is no loss of 
generality which prevents RARS from accommodating       FEs for any    . 
One straightforward approach is to initially enable two FEs while the third is kept offline as a 
cold spare. Upon finding a discrepancy between the two outputs in the duplex mode, the AE 
switches to the TMR mode of operation by placing the standby third FE online and activating a 
voting scheme among the three FEs to obtain the correct output and hence masks single-fault. 
While the duplex mode has the shortcoming of expending clock cycles from the instant it detects 
a fault until the correct functional output is regained, it reduces the required dynamic power 
compared to a conventional TMR in the no-fault scenario. Moreover, the fact that the standby FE 
is normally offline makes its resources available for use for any other purpose.  
4.1.1. Motivation as a Hybrid of Approaches 
TMR requires three functionally-identical modules that perform the same task in tandem and a 
voter that outputs the majority vote of the three modules [84]. Meanwhile, Concurrent Error 
Detection (CED) [89] approaches rely on a duplex configuration and discrepancy detection 
among the output bits of the redundant modules. Both TMR and CED can increase reliability 
using Stand-by Sparing approaches whereby hot spares are kept in an idle state and thus are 
ready to be called into action once required. Cold spares, in contrast, are kept shut down and thus 
do not consume power, but incur delay before they are able to replace faulty modules. 
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As described in SMART Design Objective 1: Exploit Reconfigurability to Realize Adaptive 
Level of Redundancy, the tradeoff in all of these approaches is between increased system 
reliability and increased resource consumption. Running in TMR means increased chances of 
keeping the system healthy, but it also consumes approximately triple the area and the power.  
Moreover, we hypothesize that fixing the redundancy level at design-time can be challenging as 
the mission engineers do not have complete knowledge of the mission trajectory and the various 
dynamic parameters than can impact it. Some missions can go smoothly for 99.99% of the time, 
only requiring high degree of redundancy in the remaining 0.01% due to a probabilistic event 
that may or may not have occurred in other similar missions. Such uncertainty complicates 
design-time decisions, and in mission-critical applications that are highly valued due to their 
scientific and social impact, the wise decision can be often to increase redundancy to be prepared 
for any events, even the unlikely ones. Thus, RARS promotes run-time adaptive redundancy 
techniques, taking advantage of the inherit reconfigurability property of the underlying FPGA 
devices. The initiative of growing and shrinking the number of spares on demand is the focal 
contribution of RARS.  
In addition, the fault recovery decision is not a black-and-white one, if the FPGA board is hit by 
a strong radiation or thermal flux such that two functional modules of a particular TMR are 
partially damaged. Assuming the third one is in a better state, it might be more useful to shut 
down the two fault modules and operate on simplex configuration, saving energy and electrical 
stress during a critical stage of the mission, and eliminating the possibility of the other two, 
faulty, modules to overrule the healthy one when they both agree on an erroneous output. A 
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simple operational mode might serve the mission purpose better than a TMR, something that 
cannot be entirely predicted during design time, but can only be wished for when certain 
conditions are met during the mission runtime. 
For that reason, we wanted the organic hardware layer of SMART to be as flexible and dynamic 
as possible; the more flexible RARS is, the more options SMART will have during mission run-
time. RARS is a generic fault-tolerant module that can operate in Simplex, Duplex, and TMR 
configurations; there are three Functional Elements (FEs) and one Autonomic Element (AE), the 
AE is a controller for the fault tolerant behavior that is completely independent from the FEs, 
which are solely in charge of accomplishing the functional requirements of the mission. 
4.1.2. Architecture and Components 
The proposed RARS architecture is shown in Figure 4. The functional input is delivered directly 
to the three FEs for evaluation. The outputs of the FEs are then sent to the AE to be processed by 
the following five modules: 
1. Discrepancy Sensor (DS): This component uses the three FE outputs to detect 
discrepancies between any pair of enabled FEs. This module is only activated when 
RARS is running in the duplex mode; otherwise, it is disabled to conserve energy.  
2. Voter. The voter module performs bitwise voting among the three FE outputs and 
produces the majority vote. It also generates a report that conveys any of the condition 
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codes listed in Table 6. The voter is enabled only in the TMR mode and otherwise is 
disabled to save power and resources.  
Table 6: Possible Values of the Voter Report 
Voter report Description 
000 No discrepancy among the three FEs 
001 FE1 is discrepant from the other two FEs 
010 FE2 is discrepant from the other two FEs 
100 FE3 is discrepant from the other two FEs 
111 All  FEs are discrepant (m-bit, m>1) 
101 Voter is disabled 
3. Output Actuator (OA): This module performs a 4x1 multiplexer function. The inputs 
come from the outputs of FE1, FE2, FE3, and the voter. The selection lines come from 
the Redundancy Controller (will be described shortly), while the output drives the overall 
system‟s functional output. This module signifies the flexibility of the AE compared to 
other fixed redundancy techniques, because RARS can select from all of the simplex 
configurations in addition to the majority vote output. 
4. Performance Monitor (PM): This module samples the DS and the voter report to provide 
reports that reflect the aggregate performance of the system. The PM is periodically 
polled by the software layer during repairs to acquire system performance to convey the 
fitness value of the evaluated individuals.   
5. Redundancy Controller (RC). This is the core element in the AE; it is responsible for the 
unit awareness and for sending status reports and receiving control signals to or from the 
software layer. In SMART, the RC is a Finite State Machine (FSM) that encodes all 
possible system configurations. The inputs to this state machine are the reports from the 
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various modules, such as the DS, voter, and the PM. The output drives the “Enable” 
signals for all the modules and the selection lines for the OA. Moreover, this module 
contains the communication logic of the dispatcher and the input and output buffers that 
store the incoming and outgoing messages. 
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Figure 4: Reconfigurable Adaptive Redundancy System (RARS) 
4.1.3. Range of Possible Configurations 
To obtain adaptive levels of redundancy, RARS uses real-time performance feedback based on 
the mission objectives to dynamically reorganize its modules into one of the following 
configurations. 
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1. Simplex. The RC disables two FEs, the DS, and the voter. The OA propagates the 
enabled FE output. This configuration allows highest energy conservation if that is a 
priority. It is also practical during non-critical stages of missions. The simplex 
configuration can also be enabled during repair in a pair-and-spare scheme.  
2. Duplex. The DS is enabled to inform the RC in the event of output disagreement between 
the two enabled FEs. The OA is set to one of the enabled FEs. This configuration is only 
used for applications that can tolerate temporary degradation in output quality until the 
RC takes further repair action. The system can run in duplex mode while repairing a 
faulty module in order to detect additional faults in the online modules. 
3. TMR: The voter and all FEs are enabled, whereas the OA propagates the voter output. 
Only the DS can be disabled as the voter report is able to convey all needed information. 
The system can maintain 100% correct throughput in the TMR mode even if one module 
is faulty. Even with the existence of multiple faults, design diversity and compensating 
module faults [13] can still assist in generating a correct vote. The TMR configuration is 
utilized in this platform when the system is repairing a faulty FE because it can maintain 
a fully functional system while the FE is repaired. This is made possible by dynamic PR, 
which keeps the system online while performing repair. 
4. Hybrid Mode. Many temporal configurations can be supported by RARS. For instance, 
an application can run in simplex mode but switch to duplex periodically to detect 
discrepancies. Another usage example might be an application that has a duplex 
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reliability requirement except during certain stages of the mission, where it can switch to 
TMR in order to meet reliability needs. Downgrading is also possible based on reliability 
needs, while the arrangement of FEs can be dynamically reconfigured back to the original 
configuration once the operating behavior has changed accordingly. 
A key consideration in RARS is that reconfiguration adds minimal additional component to 
functional critical path. The design attempts to promote the fact that if faults occur outside the 
FEs logic, only the recovery is impacted, not the FEs functionality. Therefore, we can apply the 
RARS concept recursively if needed to provide coverage for faults in the AE. Nonetheless, 
reconfiguration capability needs to remain intact for recovery by reconfiguration to remain 
viable, and also the voter logic should remain intact, as in conventional TMR approach, to 
guarantee that the correct vote is propagated as the functional output. 
Assuming that the AE voting core is an unbreakable voting element will indeed add a single-
failure point to the fault-tolerant system. However, this risk is alleviated by the fact that the voter 
element of the AE has much lower area than the FEs, meaning that the probability of fault hitting 
the voter element is reduced accordingly. The FEs in the experimental use case of the edge 
detector have a total size of approximately 1800 LUTs, compared to the voter element of 
approximately 100 LUTs. This means that the probability that a fault happens in the voter is 5% 
of the probability of a fault to hit the FEs logic. This value is still high enough to be neglected in 
mission critical applications, a successful approach to handle golden elements is random pairings 
and temporal voting that have been successfully demonstrated in [90]. Moreover, The FEs are 
expected to considerably increase in area for real complex applications, the voter is not expected 
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to scale with the same degree, further reducing the chance of broken golden element compared to 
the functional elements. 
4.2. Organic Fault-Tolerance Software Management Layer 
The software layer controls the higher-level throughput of the system by monitoring the 
performance and enabling active repair when the performance dips below an acceptable level as 
specified by the mission requirements. The software layer serves two main purposes:  
The first purpose is to provide an interface to monitor and control the hardware. To that end, a 
Java applet GUI has been created to depict the hardware status schematically and show the status 
of each component. The applet is shown in Figure 5, it shows the following information:  
1. FE Status: online, offline, faulty, fault-free, or under repair. 
2. AE Configuration: simplex, duplex, or TMR. 
3. Performance level: the number of reported discrepancies divided by the total number of 
evaluations. 
4. Log of the transmitted messages: The communicated messages are recorded as a paper-
trail of hardware status changes. 
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Figure 5: Java Applet GUI Indicating Instantaneous RARS Status 
 
The second purpose of the software layer is to enable higher-level autonomous recovery 
techniques. First, the scrubbing technique rewrites the CBS to the FPGA in order to fix any SEU 
in the configuration logic. Second, the AS are consecutively reconfigured on the FPGA until the 
faulty element is excluded from the logic path, as a way to quickly evade resources hit with hard-
faults when a proper spars is available. Last, we have demonstrated in our experimental work 
that we are able to recover simulated hard-fault by means of OGA. The fitness function was set 
to be the instantaneous performance level of RARS over a recent window of inputs.  
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4.2.1. Architecture and Components 
The top half of Figure 3 shows the architecture of the software layer. The Communication 
Manager (CM) is a multi-threaded C++ module that acts as the parallel port driver to 
communicated messages with the hardware. HIM converts the binary messages in the CM 
queues into human-readable messages that are stored in a predefined directory on the file system, 
and vice versa. The Message Decoder consults the communication protocol opcode table and 
generates text files representation of the messages. For example, this decoded message illustrates 
the status of FE #2 in RARS #1 as being online and fault-free: 
MSG_NAME: FE_STATUS_REPORT 
MSG_CODE: 3 
AE_ID: 1 
FE_ID: 2 
STATUS: 1 (ONLINE AND FAULT-FREE) 
Any application that complies with the protocol message format can communicate with the 
hardware layer. The encoder periodically polls for message files stored in a predefined directory, 
encodes them into binary representation, and stores them in the inbox queue of the CM in order 
to be sent to the organic hardware. This platform provides a bi-directional communication link 
between the organic hardware and any user application that needs to monitor and/or control it. A 
Graphical User Interface (GUI) was constructed to display hardware status. The GUI is 
dynamically updated based on the customizable message exchange frequency. 
The scrubber and the GA repair modules can be seen to the right of the CM in Figure 3.  These 
modules are described in detail in the next two sections. Both of them can reconfigure the FPGA 
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by executing batch files that invoke the Xilinx iMPACT tool [20] to perform partial device 
reconfiguration using the parallel Cable IV.  
4.2.2. Scrubbing and Amorphous Spares 
The RARS-centric techniques are sufficient to recover from transient faults in the user logic. 
SEUs in the configuration logic and hard faults cannot be indefinitely masked by redundancy 
because any further faults can shift the voting results toward the faulty FEs. Thus, in such cases, 
RARS will signal to the software layer of SMART to intervene and help fixing this type of 
persistent faults. 
SMART begins by assuming that the persistent fault is caused by an SEU in the configuration 
logic (soft fault) that caused the flipping of one or more LUT bit(s). SMART handles this via 
scrubbing the bitfile to correct the impact of the SEU and thus restore the correct funct ional 
operation of the circuit. Scrubbing entails fetching the CBS from an off-chip ROM via PowerPC 
APIs, reconfiguring the faulty FE via the ICAP, reading back the freshly downloaded bitfile to 
compare it to the ROM-based golden image, and finally monitoring the discrepancy for a 
sufficient number of evaluations to ensure that the fault is indeed corrected by scrubbing. 
If the fault is not corrected by simple CBS scrubbing, SMART concludes that it is caused by a 
hard fault that requires extra repair effort. It starts by repetitively configuring a set of design-time 
generated spares that have different area constraints to guarantee the avoidance of each and every 
LUT in at least one of the spares. This will ensure that each faulty LUT can be avoided by, at 
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least, one available spare. These spares are called amorphous because they have the same 
hardware design which can be constrained by the Xilinx tools to avoid certain LUTs, meaning 
that the spare generation effort is minimal. 
The AS generation is accomplished via the Xilinx PROHIBIT constraint in the Xilinx User 
Constraint File (UCF) [20]. The PROHIBIT constraint allows the designer to specify a set of 
LUTs that should be avoided during the placement stage of the bitfile creation process. For 
example, the following constraint will exclude all slices in the range between locations (0, 33) 
and (13, 33):  
CONFIG PROHIBIT= SLICE_X0Y33:SLICE_X13Y33 
The same HDL entry is used to generate multiple configuration bitfiles, each with different UCF 
settings that exclusively prohibit the use of a set of slices. When a fault occurs, the scrubber 
successively downloads the bitfiles to the FPGA and searches for a configuration that prohibits 
the use the faulty LUT, in which case the fault will be corrected throughout a window of 
evaluations. If none of the AS was able to hide the erroneous output, perhaps because there is 
more than one faulty LUT in the FE that cannot be excluded by any spare, the scrubber ceases to 
be efficient and will consequently request the intervention of the OGA repair.  
The scrubber is the first line of recovery from faults that cannot be handled by RARS 
reorganization techniques. SMART relies on lazy scrubbing [17] such that only the discrepant  
FE in a TMR configuration is partially reconfigured while the system remains online; the other 
two fault-free FEs, along with the voter, guarantee that the system can maintain correct overall 
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output while the faulty FE is being scrubbed. A tile-based reconfiguration approach for fault-
tolerance is covered in details in [43]. 
4.2.3. Organic GA Repair Technique  
SMART‟s autonomous fault-tolerance method installs OGA as an integral part of the repair 
cycle because it offers hard-faults active repair that is independent of the number of carried 
spares. However, the GA is a nondeterministic process than can affect the flexibility of SMART 
if not designed efficiently. Thus, three properties that can enhance the efficiency of the GA for 
an organic system were addressed. 
4.2.3.1.Direct Bitstream Evolution 
 Genetic representation is the process of mapping from the visible traits of the application (i.e., 
phenotypes) to the genetic coding of the chromosomes (i.e., genotypes), and vice versa. The 
Phenotype to Genotype Mapping (PTGM) is performed only once during the design stage of the 
GA, and it requires special care to capture the building blocks that the GA needs to evolve in 
order to achieve the desired solutions [91]. The Genotype to Phenotype Mapping (GTPM), on the 
other hand, is applied every time the individual fitness is evaluated to transform chromosomes 
into physical individuals that can be evaluated by the GA. 
This two-way mapping can be a source of errors and complications if the distance between the 
genetic encoding and the phenotypic realization is large. For instance, if the GA evolves the 
HDL code of the FE to repair its circuit realization on the FPGA, then every time the 
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chromosome is evaluated, it must undergo synthesis, mapping, Placement and Routing (PAR), 
bitfile generation, and FPGA reconfiguration, which is a huge overhead to endure for every 
evaluation. For that reason, we designed OGA to use direct bitstream evolution, whereby the 
chromosome is selected to be the FPGA raw bitfile. This selection puts the burden of PTGM on 
the FPGA vendors (Xilinx in this work) and abridges GTP to a mere Xilinx iMPACT run to 
download the CBS onto the FPGA.   
Direct evolution of a bitstream depends upon details about the LUT mapping between the CBS 
and the actual device. It is required to manipulate the encoding of the bitfile to be able to apply 
genetic operators like crossover and mutation to the relevant sections of the long bit array. This 
overhead is still considered feasible given the vast advantages of direct CBS evolution in term of 
increased performance and reduced mapping effort. In order to directly manipulate the CBS, it is 
necessary to decode its bits to understand how to locate and modify specific LUTs and thus 
change the behavior of the resulting circuit. To that end, we extended the Virtex-2 approach that 
we previously developed in [15] to perform direct bitstream evolution on Virtex-4 devices. 
The CBS contains the LUT content that is evolved by the OGA in addition to other information 
like routing, checksums, and header information such as the device signature and the time of 
bitfile creation. We implemented an LUT mapping module, as shown in Figure 6, to map the 
location of LUT_X_Y, where X and Y are valid coordinates inside the evolved FE, to the correct 
offset in the CBS file. This mapping is not entirely documented in any of Xilinx application 
notes; rather, it was discovered through repetitive trial-and-error experiments. 
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Figure 6: Mapping from LUT Coordinates to CBS Offset Representation 
Each experiment aimed to discover the mapping between one of the LUT coordinates and the 
corresponding bit offset in the CBS file. This was accomplished by viewing the Native Circuit 
Description (NCD) file using the visual Xilinx FPGA editor tool [20] and negating the content of 
one known LUT. The NCD files before and after the negations were used to generate bitfiles 
with the same bit generation (bitgen) options [20]. The two resulting CBSs were then compared 
using a hex comparator. The 16-bit LUT content could be readily identified by monitoring the 
inverted bits between the two hex files, other differences resulting from header and time stamps 
were usually located at the beginning of the bitfiles and thus promptly discarded. After many 
trials, one can infer a relation between the XY of the LUTs and their offsets in the file, or rather 
store a lookup table that contains all of the used LUTs along with their corresponding offset in 
the CBS file, to assist in the mapping. 
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4.2.3.2.Intrinsic Fitness Evaluation  
There are two methods to measure the fitness of the evolved individual. The common approach 
is extrinsic evaluation [14] , which operates on a software model of the FPGA device. This 
abstraction simplifies the experiments and can be tuned more dynamically. However, the 
resulting representation has to undergo mapping and PAR on the target FPGA at deployment 
time. This step imposes risk of incompatibility between the device's physical constraints and the 
software model that was used in simulation, thereby possibly leading to incorrect solutions. 
Instead, the OGA performs intrinsic fitness evaluation [14], whereby the hardware itself is used 
to measure the fitness of the evolved individuals. All of the device‟s physical constraints are 
considered during the process, and even the output is measured from the FPGA device while 
processing the functional inputs of the application.  
Therefore, the system can remain online during fitness evaluation, provided that there are 
redundant parts to compensate for the evolved individual. Intrinsic evaluation requires that the 
evolved circuit is configured into the FPGA device each time the fitness is measured. This 
process is made feasible because of the direct bitstream feature of OGA, which means that the 
GTPM requires only a Xilinx iMPACT device configuration to place the circuit on the FPGA. 
4.2.3.3.Model-Free Fitness Function 
 An accurate fitness function is a critical factor in designing an efficient GA because it 
determines the shape of the problem landscape that the GA will search [91]. This process can be 
extremely complicated in real-life engineering problems because it requires capturing all the 
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attributes that distinguish a good solution from other ones. In addition, it is highly dependent on 
the problem domain, because what is good for one particular purpose does not usually fit other 
purposes.  
Because SMART is intended to be a generic platform that fits any application domain, the OGA 
employs a novel, application-independent, model-free fitness function that can be ported to other 
applications with minimal effort. This was made possible because of the robust design of RARS, 
which enables run-time discrepancy detection between the evolved FE and other redundant, 
fault-free one(s). The model-free fitness function quantifies the fitness of the evaluated FE by 
counting the number of discrepancies between its output and other fault-free FE‟s. The number 
of discrepancies over a window of evaluations is stored in the PM, and is reported back by the 
RC to the OGA engine using a performance report message. This value quantifies the deviation 
between the evaluated individual‟s fitness and the ideal one, where low values indicate fitter 
individuals. Therefore, the GA becomes a minimization optimizer for this value. 
It is important to note that this model-free fitness functions is only possible when the goal is to 
repair a faulty circuit when there is another redundant circuit on the FPGA that can produce the 
same functionality. This condition does not pose any limitation on redundancy-based fault-
tolerant systems because the redundant parts are activated anyway in order to maintain correct 
functional output. The OGA takes advantage of that and implements the model-free fitness 
function. Future work might consider adding a customizable layer of application-dependent 
fitness evaluation knowledge to aid in even faster convergence.  
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4.2.3.4.OGA Design and Implementation 
The OGA platform consists of the following modules [15]: 
1. GA Engine: This is a C++ application that implements a customizable, Standard Genetic 
Algorithm (SGA). This module is platform-independent; it encapsulates the 
implementation of the SGA, including the population data structures, the functionality for 
selection and replacement, and other standard GA operators such as mutation and 
crossover. 
2. Chromosome Manipulator: This is a C-based library that abstracts the underlying 
hardware from the perspective of the OGA engine. It provides hardware-independent 
abstraction of the genetic operators so that they can be executed with regard to the LUT 
boundaries in the long CBS string.  
3. MRRA: This is a set of APIs that facilitates communication with the target FPGA device 
[55]. This module handles direct bitstream manipulation and decoding and includes the 
LUT mapping module that is depicted in Figure 6. 
4. Bitstream File: PR bitstream file that represents the FE design. It is generated beforehand 
using the Xilinx tools. The format and content of this file are identified through repetitive 
trial-and-error experiments to map the contents and location of the bits to the physical 
LUT locations in the FE. 
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Figure 7 shows the complete OGA platform. The OGA engine relies on the chromosome 
manipulator to perform platform-independent mutation and crossover operations. It also reads 
the fitness values from the CM, which in turn acquires them directly from the hardware via the 
communication protocol messages. The MRRA module operates directly on the bitstream using 
the LUT mapping module shown in Figure 6, and then invokes a batch file that runs the 
iMPACT tool, which performs boundary-scan device-chain initialization and then programs the 
chip. All communication proceeds via the parallel port from the host PC side to the JTAG port 
from the FPGA side.  
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Figure 7: OGA Intrinsic Evolution Platform 
The OGA creates the initial population based on the PR bitfile that was used to configure the 
original faulty FE. It generates a copy of the bitfile for each individual in the initial population, 
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and then randomizes its LUT bits to promote genetic diversity that should lead to more 
innovative solutions.  
After that, each individual‟s fitness is evaluated intrinsically by downloading its bitfile to the 
FPGA using iMPACT. The OGA engine then requests the fitness value of the evaluated 
individual using a PERFORMANCE_REQUEST message that is sent to RARS through the 
JTAG-GNAT interface. The RC reads the PM counters, which are updated periodically based on 
the actual run-time functional inputs that the FEs process, it then formulates 
PERFORMANCE_REPORT as a reply message and sends it back to the GA engine. 
After evaluating the fitness of all individuals, the OGA selects the individuals that will 
participate in the creation of the next generation using tournament selection of size 2 (value was 
set based on preliminary runs aimed to locate the most promising GA parameters for the 
experimental work). The selected individuals are then mated to create the offspring using single-
point crossover and conventional bit-flip mutation operation. Both operators are executed on the 
raw bitfile as mandated by the direct bitstream evolution premise. The mapping between the 
LUT coordinates and its actual location in the bitfile is abstracted using the LUT mapping 
module that was demonstrated in Figure 6 to map FE XY coordinates to the actual offset of the 
evolved LUTs location in the bitfile.  
Finally, the newly created offspring is assigned to the population of the next generation and the 
OGA repeats the same steps over and over until an adequate solution is found, which in our 
experiments was defined as realizing no discrepancies at all between the evolved individual and 
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the fault-free ones over a predefined window of readings. This termination criterion can be 
relaxed for more complex applications or ones that require faster repair time at the expense of the 
fitness of the final solution. 
4.3. Fault-Handling Handshaking-Based Communication Protocol 
The communication protocol consists of two components. The first is the hardware component 
that resides on the FPGA board and includes the standard JTAG interface serial port and the 
GNAT platform [15] , which is configured on the device to support input and output operations 
with the AE. The second component is the software, which runs on a host PC that is connected to 
the FPGA. The AE sends messages to the Dispatcher, which is then polled by the CM from the 
software layer via the JTAG interface. On the other way around, binary-encoded messages are 
shifted from the CM to the Dispatcher via JTAG and then routed to the destination AE or 
broadcasted to all AEs. The messages are 16 bits in width, with a Xilinx Parallel Cable IV 
download rate of 5 Mbps [92], the communication link can theoretically handle up to 300,000 
messages per second.  
The JTAG boundary scan interface (IEEE 1149.1) is implemented on the non-reconfigurable 
area of the Xilinx Virtex devices. The interface offers half-duplex serial communication between 
the user circuit on the FPGA and the host PC. The GNAT component is implemented on the 
reconfigurable area of the chip to connect the JTAG boundary scan with the user circuit to 
provide bi-directional communication channel. The communication protocol relies on 
handshaking to acknowledge received messages and request new ones. The protocol also 
69 
 
specifies a 16-bit packet format with 5 bits reserved for the opcode, thus supporting up to 32 
message types, while the remaining fields are used for AE and FE addressing, and other purposes 
like performance readings and component status.  The messages defined in the protocol along 
with their field specifications are listed in the Appendix: Communication Protocol Messages. 
The class diagram of the software communication layer is shown in Figure 8. Special care was 
taken to design the CM to enhance availability and graceful degradation. These objectives were 
mandated by the fact that the system is designed for mission-critical applications. Hence, multi-
threading and non-blocking calls were extensively employed in the design to support these non-
functional requirements. Multi-threading was adopted such that every active communication is 
held over its own thread. This design prevents blocking the controller class, thereby making it 
available to serve any other incoming calls. For example, if the connection object informs the 
communication controller object that there is a new message that requires processing, the 
communication controller opens a separate thread to handle the message, leaving the main object 
free to engage in any other operation. 
The AE allocates inbox and outbox queues to respectively store incoming and outgoing message; 
in addition, it continues to poll the head of the inbox queue periodically to search for new 
messages. Once the AE finds one, it decodes the opcode field to extract the message type and 
then forms a response message to serve the request, placing it at the end of the outbox queue to 
be processed later by the software layer.  
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The communication protocol relies on handshaking to acknowledge received messages and 
request new ones. Examples of the messages that flow from the software to the hardware are as 
follows. 
1- FE_STATUS_REQUEST solicits the status of a particular FE (RARS_Index.FE_Index). 
2- AE_STATUS_REQUEST solicits the status of a particular AE (RARS_ Index.AE_ 
Index). 
3- PERFORMANCE_REQUEST asks a particular RARS to report back the values of the 
Performance Counter (PC). 
The respective responses of the hardware to these messages are as follows. 
1- FE_STATUS_REPORT reports FE status (such as online healthy, online faulty, offline, 
and so on). 
2- AE_STATUS_REPORT reports AE status (such as Simplex, Duplex, Voter, and so on). 
3- PERFORMANCE_REPORT reports the PC value. 
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Figure 8: Class Diagram of the Communication Module in the Software Layer 
4.4. Dynamic Partial Reconfiguration  
SMART relies on the repetitive reconfiguration of the FPGA to achieve active repair via 
scrubbing and intrinsic evolution. Dynamic PR was successfully introduced into the RARS 
hardware in order to reduce repair time. Introducing dynamic PR into this design, the faulty FEs 
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could be reconfigured in 1.8% of the time originally required to reconfigure the entire system. 
This improvement becomes extremely important during the repair process, considering that the 
OGA may require thousands of evaluations to evolve an adequate solution.  This approach also 
has the added advantage of keeping the system online during bitstream downloading. 
Early Access Partial Reconfiguration (EAPR) design flow [93] was used to achieve dynamic PR 
capabilities. This flow requires a strict design routine that does not follow the conventional 
single-pass of synthesis, mapping, and PAR. Instead, it requires the design to have an explicit 
modular structure such that the PR modules are singled out at the top-level module. These 
modules are called Partial Reconfigurable Modules (PRM), whereas the region of the fabric to 
be reconfigured is defined as a Partial Reconfigurable Region (PRR). PRMs define the 
functionality of each PRR. All other logic in the design is referred to as static logic. All resources 
required for an FE must be confined within a PRR.  
To connect each FE with the surrounding logic, a special interface is required, known as a Bus 
Macro (BM). BMs are special structures that are implemented with the help of CLB in which 
pre-configured LUTs are used to transfer signals between the static logic and the reconfigurable 
region. A group of LUTs in one CLB is placed on the PRR side, and another group of LUTs in 
another CLB is placed on the static side. This two-CLB macro can provide a communication 
bandwidth of up to 8 bits. BMs are made available by Xilinx to compensate for the old 
alternative of using hard-wired tri-state buffers, which have been used with earlier PR design 
flows and are known to present strict constraints on the communication bandwidth due to the 
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limited number of buffers available on the fabric. The BMs are uni-directional structures and can 
be placed on all sides of a PRR. 
The other factor to consider in the PR process is the configuration frame size of the target device. 
For Xilinx Virtex 4 FPGAs, a frame is 16 CLBs long and one CLB wide. The time to reconfigure 
a functional element depends on the bitstream size, which is proportional to the number of 
frames. The resource allocated to each FE is the same because the three elements are functionally 
and physically identical. The total number of configurable logic blocks allocated to each FE is 
112. Each FE requires seven logic configuration frames to be loaded for its partial 
reconfiguration.  
The introduction of partial reconfiguration reduced the size of the bitstream considerably and 
thus improved the reconfiguration time for the FEs. The full bitstream size is 1.7 MB, and it 
takes 2.61 seconds to fully download using the Parallel Cable IV. However, the partial bitstream 
is 31 KB and requires only 48 milliseconds to configure. This improvement becomes extremely 
important during the repair process, considering that the GA may require thousands of 
evaluations to evolve an adequate solution. In addition, the PRR can be reconfigured while the 
system is running. Therefore, considering that the system will be running in the TMR mode, 
under the assumption of a single-fault scenario, the system can still maintain 100% performance 
while undergoing repairs. 
Figure 9 shows a snapshot of each of the three PRRs along with the static, top-level full design 
of the RARS. The placement of the PRR and the BMs was achieved with the help of the Xilinx 
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PlanAhead tool [93] . All of the clock signals BUFGs, I/O signals, BMs, and DCMs were 
defined in the top-level module. A user constraint file was assigned to the top-level module that 
contained all of the I/O pin constraints, the range of all of the PRRs using the AREA_GROUP 
constraint, and the location of all of the bus macros. 
 
Figure 9: FPGA Layout for FE1, FE2, FE3, and RARS 
4.5. The Repair Cycle and Self-x Properties 
The controlled emergence of self-x properties is what distinguishes OCs from other design 
paradigms [48]. Rather than providing all alternative execution paths at design time, the system 
is equipped with innate capability to actuate different configurations based on run-time sensory 
information, making it adaptive to various execution scenarios. 
Figure 10 shows the repair cycle that the system executes in order to maintain the highest 
possible correct throughput. The flow diagram is partitioned into three black-framed boxes to 
signify the observed organic self-x properties that emerge upon executing each repair stage.  
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The left side of the diagram shows the organic repair that is implemented on the FPGA device. 
The prominent observed self-x properties are self-monitoring and self-organization. The self-
monitoring property is manifested by the system‟s self-awareness of any discrepancy that results 
from one or more faulty FE(s) through the use of different sensors, enhanced with self-diagnosis 
of the exact faulty FE through monitoring the discrepancies of the output lines. The first repair 
action the system takes upon detecting faults is reorganizing the components of the system to 
mask the fault. The self-organization property emerges through adjusting the redundancy 
configuration in order to hide the effect of hardware failures. The example in Figure 10 shows a 
Duplex-TMR-Duplex reorganization scenario, but other reorganization sequences can be applied 
to meet the desired reliability levels as mandated by the mission requirements. 
When the degree of the faults exceeds the inherent redundancy capacity of RARS, SMART 
triggers a different repair cycle that demonstrates another organic activity, namely, self-
configuration. The self-configuration property emerges through successive lazy-scrubbing [17] 
attempts, which begins by rewriting the same CBS to eliminate SEUs in the configuration logic. 
Then, if the fault is caused by a stuck-at hard-fault, scrubbing proceeds to reconfiguring the 
FPGA with a set of pre-seeded amorphous spares that have different area constraints to 
potentially introduce an FE that does not utilize the faulty LUT.   
Finally, if self-configuration fails to bypass the faulty element(s), the system initiates a more 
elaborate refurbishment cycle that relies on OGA. This evolutionary repair introduces self-
healing property at the system-level, which is characterized by the system‟s ability to actively 
recover from more catastrophic fault scenarios by searching for innovative solutions using 
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evolutionary approaches. Self-healing is not limited by the degree of redundancy nor the number 
of amorphous spares, which makes it a compelling option for complex fault scenarios. However, 
SMART makes OGA the last resort in the repair sequence due to its long repair time.  
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In SMART, failures in the reconfiguration logic will only cause the loss of the software-based 
fault-tolerance features, that is, scrubbing and OGA. However, the inherent organic hardware of 
RARS will remain intact to switch among the available Simplex, Duplex and Triplex 
configurations. This graceful degradation property means that the system will become, at worst, 
a TMR system if the parallel/serial interface fails.  
Complete handling of failures in reconfiguration logic in FPGA devices is beyond the scope of 
this work, we relied on proven solutions provided by Xilinx, the main manufacturer of FPGA 
chips, to deal with this type of faults [94]. Moreover, the same techniques used in handling faults 
in the data path can be extended to the reconfiguration logic. One prominent approach in dealing 
with this kind of faults using redundancy can be found in [95]. 
Virtex-4 FPGAs are fully characterized for Single-Event Functional Interrupts (SEFI), which are 
SEEs that result in device-wide operation interrupts such as power on reset, configuration 
circuitry, frame address register used extensively in the reconfiguration process, and some other 
global signals that affect reconfiguration logic and device functionality. Xilinx states that pulsing 
the PROG signal will result in correcting any of the aforementioned SEFIs [94].  
More catastrophic faults, such as hard faults affecting the ICAP, can be recovered using 
redundancy techniques presented in [95]. This technique protects the ICAP logic in a similar 
fashion to any other user application logic. First, by having TMR inserted in the ICAP circuit 
using BL-TMR tools to correct faulty configuration on the fly. Second, by scrubbing the ICAP 
interface in case an SEU is suspected in the configuration logic. These techniques can be used to 
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prevent the parallel/serial configuration interfaces from becoming a single point of failure in 
SMART. 
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CHAPTER 5: EXPERIMENTS AND RESULTS 
Using the Xilinx Video Starter Kit (VSK) FPGA board shown in Figure 11 [96] and the other 
technologies listed in Table 4, the benefits of SMART are demonstrated quantitatively using a 
2D gradient-base Sobel edge detection algorithm. 
 
 
Figure 11: Xilinx Dual-Layered Video Starter Kit 
5.1. Experimental Configuration: Edge Detection Application 
In this work, we implement a popular edge detection algorithm to demonstrate the capabilities of 
SMART. There are various applications for edge detection, as it involves identifying boundaries 
in an image. Thus, it can be employed for object recognition and quality monitoring in industrial 
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applications, medical imaging applications, such as Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) and 
ultrasound imaging [56], and satellite imaging applications [57]. Numerous efforts have been 
made to design edge detectors using evolutionary techniques [56, 63]; we compare our GA 
performance against those techniques in Table 11.  
Figure 12 shows SMART application architecture where a continuous video stream provides the 
functional input to the circuit. The video is transmitted via either the Video Graphic Array (VGA) 
or the Digital Video Interface (DVI) output ports on the host PC to the VGA-In or DVI-In, 
respectively, on the upper board of the Xilinx VSK, the Video IO Daughter Card (VIODC) [96]. 
In this system, we used the VGA ports on both ends, but nothing prevents the system from 
running on a DVI interface because of the versatility of the AD9887A dual interface on the 
VOIDC. Indeed, this IC offers both an analog and a digital receiver integrated on a single chip. 
The AD9887 has a parallel digital bus interface with the FPGA for video data and an I2C control 
bus for configuration. The captured frames are buffered into the Block RAM (BRAM) of the 
Virtex-II Pro XCV2P7 FPGA on VIODC. The frames are continuously written on the BRAMs; 
if the video feed stops then the last captured frame is used for all pixel operations until the feed is 
resumed. 
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Figure 12: SMART Use Case System Architecture 
A sequencer module handles memory scanning and synchronization and sends the pixel data 
through the Xilinx Generic Interface (XGI) connector [96]. This connector is a 64-bit bus which 
connects between the lower board, referred to as the ML402 motherboard, and the upper VIODC 
board. It uses a simple synchronous interface running at 100 MHz to send data and control 
information between the two boards.  
A goal achieved in the prototype is application-independence. That is, any other application can 
be implemented by designing new logic in the FEs and by tuning the clock-division ratio in the 
DCM to match the frequencies of the AE and the FEs. 
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Applications that are known to be more tolerant to errors than other kinds of design, such as 
Signal processing applications, will tend to ameliorate the impact of erroneous behavior. 
However, the metric reported in our results is actual data path bitwise discrepancies of the 
output. The fitness function did not rely on any kind of pixel averaging or gradient-based 
operators to quantify image quality into fitness values. This discrepancy-based metric on a pixel-
by-pixel basis makes this approach applicable for non digital signal processing applications with 
no loss of generality. 
On the ML402 motherboard, the enabled FEs in RARS process the video feed and provide the 
output to the AE. Based on the current configuration of the system, the AE produces the overall 
output and stores it into the XCV4SX35 BRAMs. In fact, it stores both the original and the edge-
detected video stream for demonstration purposes. The BRAMs are continuously scanned by a 
VGA driver that is implemented on the same FPGA to generate the VSCAN, HSCAN, and RGB 
values for the VGA-Out interface. The VGA-out is connected to another monitor that shows both 
the original and edge–detected video streams. Any error in the edge detection can be clearly 
spotted on this monitor, as shown in Figure 14. 
The three FEs and the AE are connected to the host PC that runs the organic software layer. This 
PC is tied to a monitor that displays the real-time status of the organic layer using the GUI Java 
applet. The status and control signals are passed between the FEs/AE on one side and the 
BSCAN/JTAG on the other side. The organic layer and the FEs (i.e., the Sobel edge detector) 
were implemented using Verilog HDL and synthesized into FPGA bitfiles using the Xilinx ISE 
9.1 software packs [20] 
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The DIP switches beneath the LCD screen on the ML402 FPGA board were used to simulate 
stuck-at faults in the data path to test the ability of RARS to switch configurations in order to 
mask faults immediately. One of the switches was also used to enable or disable the organic 
repair capabilities (i.e., AE Enable), as shown in Table 7. Nine LEDs were used to show the 
status of various modules of the design. Three of them reflect the status of the voter report shown 
in Table 6, whereas the other six show the status of the FEs, with two LEDs per FE, as shown in 
Table 8.  
Table 7: DIP Switch Assignment in RARS Prototype 
DIP-Switch Purpose 
1 AE Enable to control organic capabilities  
2 Stuck-at fault injected in FE1  
3 Stuck-at fault injected in FE2 
4 Stuck-at fault injected in FE3 
Table 8: LED Assignment in RARS Prototype 
LED 1 LED 2 FE status 
OFF  OFF  Offline and faulty 
OFF  ON  Offline 
ON  OFF  Online and faulty 
ON  ON  Online 
It is imperative to mention that the fault simulation accomplished via the dip switches is only for 
the SEUs or stuck-at faults in the data path. This was done by masking the enabled dip switch 
logical value with one bit of the pixels input of the edge detector to affect the data signals. This 
kind of error should be repaired instantly by the hardware through the embedded configurations 
of RARS. However, in order to simulate the stuck-at faults in the configuration logic, we had to 
actually alter the value of one or more of the LUT contents. We accomplished this by using the 
FPGA editor to manually alter the content of one LUT in the NCD file in schematic view. Both 
84 
 
types of fault simulation were used to test the system repair cycle in Figure 10 and to test the 
intrinsic OGA repair as shown below. 
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Figure 13: Use Case Physical Design using Xilinx VSK Platform 
The PC and JTAG prototype is only meant as a testing environment for SMART. The 
convenience and performance of using a PC to run the GA APIs and the communication 
applications have greatly reduced development time and validation effort. However, deploying 
the host PC with SMART will actually eliminate any benefit for such system, either from power 
or reliability points of view. Therefore, we believe that the system will not realize its original 
design goals unless it is deployed on a PowerPC processor that comes embedded within the 
majority of the high-end Xilinx FPGA boards. Many successful PowerPC deployment efforts for 
fault-tolerant systems have been reported in literature, especially ones that employ evolutionary 
repair techniques. 
In [97], the design and implementation of an intrinsic evolution system is presented. The system 
relies on online evaluation of fitness, i.e. using the functional input of the circuit in runtime. The 
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GA was implemented in C (similar to OGA in this work), and was embedded on PowerPC 405 
embedded processor on a Virtex-II device. Another approach is reported in [98] where a 
PowerPC-based intrinsic GA and a workstation-based extrinsic GA are compared in term of the 
fitness evaluation time. The intrinsic GA evolves image recognition system was implemented on 
a PowerPC residing on a Virtex-II Pro FPGA, it was shown that it achieved fitness evaluation 
speed comparable to software fitness evaluation that was run on a workstation operating on 30-
times the frequency of the PowerPC. One might consider using the soft-core that can be 
configured on the FPGA, like Microblaze, to achieve similar goals. However, as [99] 
demonstrates, soft cores will consume huge number of LUTs and would consume much more 
power, they are also vulnerable to the same radiation effects that can affect other logic on the 
board, making them far less appealing approach for fault-tolerant system implementations. 
Finally, the ability of IBM PowerPC to process C/C++ code [100] mitigates the risk of porting 
SMART into on-board implementation as all the GA and communication APIs in SMART are 
based on ANSI/ISO standard, the only difference being the need to interface with the ICAP 
rather than the parallel IV cable, which is completely supported by the PowerPC APIs [100]. 
5.2. Use Case Results 
The following scenarios were tested successfully, these scenarios simulate a stuck-at fault at a 
given FE using dip-switches on the FPGA board to demonstrate the system‟s ability to 
autonomously detect, isolate, and repair the fault. 
Scenario 1: Fault injection when the AE is disabled: 
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1. The system runs in duplex mode, where two FEs are running the edge-detection 
algorithm and the third one is in „cold standby‟ (inactive) mode. 
2. DIP-switch 1 is OFF, indicating that the AE is disabled and will not be able to monitor 
faults in the FEs 
3. DIP-switch 2 (FE-1 fault injection) is turned ON. The edge detected image starts to show 
faulty pixels and degradation in the quality of the image. Voter report is always ON-OFF-
ON, indicating that the voter is disabled (That is because the AE is inactive) 
Scenario-2: Fault injection when the AE is enabled: 
1. The system runs in duplex mode, where two FEs are running the edge-detection 
algorithm and the third one is in „cold standby‟ (inactive) mode. 
2. DIP-switch 1 is ON, indicating that the AE is enabled and should be able to monitor 
faults in the FEs 
3. DIP-switch 2 (FE-1 fault injection) is turned ON. The edge detected image shows NO 
faulty pixels and the quality of the image remains the same, this is due to the AE 
intervention which can be summarized as follow: 
a.  AE detects discrepancy in FE1. FE1 status becomes (Online and faulty) 
b. AE enables FE3 and change its status from Offline to Online. 
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c. AE enables the voter, the discrepancy report changes from (Voter disabled) to 
(FE1 discrepant) 
d. The output is taken from the majority vote and hence shows no degradation in the 
performance 
Scenario-3: Recovering the injected fault causes the system to shift to Duplex mode again. 
1. Starting from Scenario-2 output: a Triplex system in which FE1 is faulty. 
2. DIP-switch 2 (FE-1 fault injection) is turned OFF again, indicating that the fault is 
recovered.  
3. The voter report LEDs change from (FE1 discrepant) to (No discrepancy). 
4. After 5-second window without any discrepant readings, the AE realizes that the fault is 
recovered and the TMR mode is not needed anymore, it disables FE3 (status changes 
from Online to Offline) and the Voter (status changes from No discrepancy to Voter 
disabled). 
Figure 14 (a) shows the sample input satellite image of urban buildings having industrial factory 
fans along with the fault-free result of real-time processing of that image using the Sobel edge 
detection algorithm. Figure 14 (b) depicts the scenario of single-fault in the data path that can be 
simulated using switches 2, 3, or 4 as defined in Table 7. Upon the detection of the discrepancy 
caused by the fault, the RARS switches to the TMR configuration, thereby allowing the system 
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to maintain 100% of its fault-free throughput. Hence there is no degradation in quality as 
compared to the fault-free scenario. Figure 14 (c) depicts the impact of another stuck-at fault at a 
different FE, in which case system performance drops, as can be seen from the degraded edge-
detected image. When the software monitoring layer initiates the refurbishment of one of the 
faulty FEs through PR, the system regains 100% performance, as shown in Figure 14 (d). Thus, 
the application throughput is restored using hardware identification of resource capabilities and 
autonomous refurbishment. 
 
 
Figure 14 (a): Fault-free Scenario 
 
Figure 14 (b): single-fault Scenario 
 
Figure 14 (c): Two faulty FEs Scenario 
 
Figure 14 (d): After-repair scenario 
Figure 14: Original and Edge-detected Images under Different RARS Configurations 
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The intrinsic bitstream evolution targeted eight LUTs in the entire FE design. These LUTs were 
selected after investigating the different impacts that each LUT selection might have on overall 
system performance. Based on preliminary experiments, we were able to extract the critical 
LUTs [85] that are highly influential for the performance of the Edge Detector circuit.  
The average fitness and best fitness values per generation averaged over 20 runs, along with the 
standard deviation for both values are shown in Figure 9. The maximum fitness value is 2,047 
(     ), which means that out of 2,047 discrepancy reading, the evolved FE does not show any 
discrepancy when its output is compared to the other configured fault-free FE outputs.  
The maximum fitness value in this work is 2047; this value does not actually denote the number 
of possible output combinations as in most conventional circuit evolution approaches. Instead, it 
indicates the number of discrepancies between the outputs of the evolved FE compared to 
another fault-free FE. To establish enough significance in the reported fitness value, the 
application records the number of discrepancies over a window of 65,536 evaluations, which 
denotes the number of pixels in one 256x256 video frame for the use case under study. Due to 
the message width limitation which confined the fitness value field width to 11 bits only, the 
hardware implemented a scaling scheme in which the actual number of evaluations of 65,536 
values was scaled down by 32 to fit the field width of 11. This means that the circuit is actually 
evaluated for 65,536 input combinations where each 32 discrepancies are translated into 1 point 
on the normalized fitness scale. This technique provides wide evaluation window for the OGA to 
span one full frame, yet avoids high transmission bandwidth for fitness reporting between the 
hardware and software. Another approach to expand the evaluation window while keeping the 11 
90 
 
bit field width is to poll the fitness values for a predefined number of times in the OGA API and 
then average the readings or possibly detect and eliminate outliers, this software solution 
provides a way to control the number of evaluations needed to assess the evolved individual‟s 
fitness. Finally, the message width of 16bit is just an arbitrary selection for the experimental 
extension of SMART. In real application, the message width can be extended to 32 or even 64 
bits, allowing for largest fitness value field and thus accommodating wider evaluation window. 
Table 9: Fitness and Timing Information for Twenty GA Runs 
Run # Final Fitness Timing information 
Best Avg Number of 
Generations 
Total Fitness 
Evaluation 
Time (sec) 
Total FPGA 
Configuratio
n Time (sec) 
Total Genetic 
Operators 
Time (usec) 
1 2047 2033 147 23.69 83.50 2098.75 
2 2047 2043 217 35.27 111.97 3172.50 
3 2047 2006 78 12.13 35.65 1106.88 
4 2047 2015 156 25.34 81.74 2421.88 
5 2047 1989 99 15.96 50.09 1470.00 
6 2047 2001 148 24.09 77.40 2205.00 
7 2047 2005 152 25.01 79.34 2170.63 
8 2047 2020 126 20.50 63.76 1835.94 
9 2047 2044 252 41.27 127.01 3686.56 
10 2047 2032 71 11.46 36.00 984.38 
11 2047 2000 221 35.99 112.49 3093.75 
12 2047 1998 162 26.27 75.82 2364.69 
13 2047 2018 103 16.65 51.19 1530.00 
14 2047 2044 129 21.18 64.89 1920.00 
15 2047 2046 177 29.01 91.33 2585.00 
16 2047 2045 161 78.80 84.85 2250.00 
17 2047 2007 75 12.18 39.00 1133.13 
18 2047 1993 233 38.11 117.43 3480.00 
19 2047 2015 62 9.99 31.93 876.88 
20 2047 2044 202 33.42 98.78 2826.56 
Average   2019.90 148.55 26.82 75.71 2160.63 
Standard 
deviation 
  19.80 56.73 15.40 29.00 825.48 
Confidence   0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 0.95 
Alpha   0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 
95% 
Confidence 
Interval 
  (2011.2, 
2028.5) 
(123.69,173.41) (20.07,33.57) (63.00,88.42) 
 
(1798.8,2522.4) 
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Table 10: OGA Parameters used in Experiments 
Parameter Value 
Population size 10 
Mutation rate 0.3 
Elitism size 1 
Crossover rate 0.8 
Tournament size 2 
  
 
Figure 15: OGA Best and Average Fitness Results 
 
Table 9 shows details of the 20 runs that are averaged in Figure 15. All runs converged to a final 
solution based on the OGA parameters listed in Table 10. These parameters were determined 
using preliminary experiments with analysis of variance (ANOVA) study of the interaction effect 
between the parameters. We found that these parameter settings produced the best GA 
performance for this particular application and settings. The average number of generations 
0
500
1000
1500
2000
2500
0 50 100 150 200 250
Fi
tn
es
s
Generations
Best Fitness Average Fitness
Stdev of Best Fitness Stdev of Average Fitness
92 
 
required to repair the fault for the 20 runs is 148 generations, while the 95% confidence interval 
is between 123 and 173 generations. Thus, 95% of the time, a repair happens in less than 173 
generations. 
The runs produced very small deviation in the average fitness of the population; this is partly due 
to the small population size. The table also shows the timing information for fitness evaluation, 
PR time, and genetic operator overhead. Although we used PR, the configuration time was still 
the dominant factor in repair time. For example, the first run required 83.5 seconds of 
reconfiguration time for a total of 147 generations, which means that each generation required 
                seconds to configure a population of 10 individuals, resulting in 56.8 msec 
per bitfile. This is close to the theoretical value obtained by dividing the bitstream size by the 
Cable speed (                     ). This value accounts only for CBS transmission 
time, but in reality, there is a 95% probability that the configuration time will take 64 to 88 msec. 
Table 11 compares the edge detection evolutionary approach that was implemented in this work 
to three edge-detector evolution attempts [56, 62, 63]. The model-free fitness function provides 
an application-independent approach as compared to the complex fitness functions adopted by 
the others. The simplicity and straightforwardness of the discrepancy-based fitness function was 
another plus compared to the complicated fitness functions used by other approaches, though 
OGA aims to repair faulty edge-detectors rather than design them from scratch or from a 
preliminary template. SMART is the only approach that demonstrated edge-detector evolution on 
the actual hardware, other methods used software models to evaluate the fitness. 
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Table 11: Comparison between SMART and Other Edge Detection Evolution Techniques 
 
Hollingworth [63] Gudmundsson 
[56] 
Ross [62] RARS  
Application Generic images 
(fairly simple) 
Unfragmented, 
localized thin edges 
in medical images. 
Microscopic 
images from 
mineral samples. 
Generic (satellite 
images, uniform 
patterns, and so on). 
Methodology Exploit inherent 
parallelism in images  
Split image into 
linked sub-images. 
Maintain links 
between adjacent 
pixels. 
Implement a 
training stage 
(requires 
sampling 23.6% 
of image), 
followed by 
genetic 
programming. 
Evolve a subset of 
the Edge Detector 
(i.e., critical LUTs) 
to recover from 
faults.  
Fitness 
Evaluation 
Software model Software model  Software model  Intrinsic evolution 
on the hardware  
Evolutionary 
Algorithm 
Genetic 
programming. 
2D Genetic 
Algorithm with 
problem-specific 
operators. 
Genetic 
programming 
training (~25%) 
and evolution 
(~75%). 
Genetic algorithm. 
Genetic 
String 
Coding 
Four node functions 
(i.e., and, or, not, and 
xor) and eight 
terminal values for 
pixels around the 
evolved pixel. 
Edge map. Image 
pixels are masked 
with corresponding 
values in pixel map 
(i.e., 0: no edge, 1: 
edge). 
High-level 
functions (i.e., 
avg, min, max, 
and stdev). 
Terminal pixels 
and high-level 
ephemerals (i.e., 
gradient and 
intensity). 
Direct bitstream 
evolution. The 
solution coding is 
the actual bitfile. 
Fitness 
Function 
Pratt figure of merit 
(PFM) relative to 
fault-free Sobel edge 
detector 
Highly complex 
cost function based 
on five cost factors. 
Biased random 
sampling fitness 
evaluation for 
training. Program 
fitness is similar 
to PFM. 
Model-free, triplex 
discrepancy-based 
function. No 
application-specific 
a priori knowledge 
needed. 
Evolution 
Speed 
Partial solution in 
2,333 generations 
after 24 hours of 
evolution time. 
2,300 generations 
used for ring 
imaging; 300 
generations used 
for thin, well-
localized edges. 
75 generations, 
with 25% of 
images used for 
training. Very 
large population 
size of 2,000. 
148 generations, 
with low population 
size of 10. Evolved 
8 critical LUTs. 
Best Fitness Not reported 0.85 PFM with 
scaling factor of 
0.01. 
0.590 for Image 1; 
0.633 for Image 2. 
100% as compared 
to output from fault-
free Sobel edge 
detector. 
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5.3. The Relationship between RARS and the OGA 
RARS is the hardware organic component of SMART. Its primary purpose is masking transient 
faults that result from SEU in the user logic until the affected user register is re-written with a 
new value from subsequent operations. In addition, RARS helps maintaining correct functional 
output even in the case of soft faults in the configuration logic, until the scrubber re-downloads 
the CBS and corrects the upset. However, In the case of hard faults, RARS cease to be efficient 
as it does not have the mean to find alternative paths to circumvent faulty LUTs. Here comes the 
role of the OGA, which will be invoked by SMART‟s controller to realize solutions even in the 
case of hard faults. Still, RARS plays significant role in hard-fault repair by interacting with the 
OGA in the following ways: 
1. As the OGA is a guided heuristic search method that requires evaluating many 
individuals until a good solution is found, and because the OGA performs online fitness 
assessment, meaning that the evaluated individual is configured on the circuit and is 
evaluated using the runtime functional inputs that drive the application, RARS conceal 
the effect of evaluating suboptimal individuals by switching to TMR mode so that the 
erroneous outputs of the evaluated individuals are overruled by other fault-free FEs, just 
as if the evolved FE is affected by a transient fault. This will give the OGA enough time 
to evolve optimal individual without affecting the functional operation of the circuit. 
2. The OGA relies on the self-monitoring capabilities or RARS, which evaluates the 
evolved FE and presents its fitness value to the OGA engine. The OGA by itself cannot 
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assess the fitness of the intrinsically-evolved individual and thus needs to interact with 
RARS. 
To demonstrate this behavior, we applied a sequence of injected faults on RARS and monitored 
the performance of the application. Then, we superimposed OGA repair experiments taken under 
the same conditions to create a holistic experiment that exploits the two pieces together. The 
precondition for this sequence of events is that hard fault MTTR should be greater than the 
MTBF; this condition is almost always realized in space missions due to low MTTF in radiation-
hardened FPGA devices that employ epitaxial CMOS process technology to lessen the impact of 
energetic particles hitting the silicon. As seen in the figure, the number of faulty FEs in RARS 
increases from 1 to 2 to 3 by time, as there is no mechanism to repair hard faults. On the other 
hand, hard faults in the FEs are corrected as they occur to maintain a number of faulty FEs less 
than or equal to 1. With the help of RARS, this guarantees a steady 100% overall performance of 
the application, even though the faulty FEs are being evaluated online with performance levels 
down to 15% at some point of time. The non-OGA mode will eventually suffer degraded 
operation when there is two or more faulty FEs. With 3 Faulty FEs, the overall performance of 
RARS gets closer to 50%. The voter hits this performance level due to compensating fault 
scenarios in which the FEs do not fail in the same way and thus can still vote for the correct 
output in about 50% of the cases.  
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Figure 16: Holistic Experiment Demonstrating the Interaction between RARS and OGA  
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CHAPTER 6: AVAILABILITY, AREA, AND POWER EVALUATION 
METRCIS 
After successfully demonstrating the ability of SMART to self-repair simulated soft and hard 
faults in a real edge-detection use case, we intend to evaluate its availability, area usage, and 
energy consumption against standard and well-accepted evaluation metrics. The aim is to 
demonstrate and quantify the benefit of SMART over other conventional fault-tolerance 
approaches that rely on fixed redundancy and scrubbing. SMART has two main advantages: 
1. Capability of handling hard faults: Most fault-tolerance systems ignore hard fault 
handling because they are less frequent than soft ones. However, with NASA plans of 
executing space missions that last for many years, the likelihood of radiation-induced 
hard faults become higher and higher. Moreover, Xilinx reports that under stressful 
thermal conditions, aging-related faults can happen after 3 years only [37],  which makes 
it unwise to just ignore hard faults specially in multi-million mission-critical systems. 
SMART handles hard faults using an intrinsic evolutionary repair mechanism that have 
been actually implemented and shown to successfully repair simulated hard faults, as 
demonstrated in Section 5.2. 
2. Adapting the redundancy based on the mission reliability and resource requirements: 
TMR runs three times the user logic all the time to mask faults as they happen in very 
small portions of the mission duration. This attribute can be really costly, especially in 
term of energy consumption in very long space missions like deep space probes which 
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use limited power sources that need to last for long periods. SMART design philosophy 
is to provide adaptive level of redundancy by organically controlling which level to select 
at runtime based on the mission requirements and the environment parameters.  
Both advantages need to be properly evaluated using standard metrics. First, calculating MTTR 
of hard faults and soft faults is not enough to judge SMART‟s abilities to sustain realistic 
missions. Thus, based on published data and experimental measurements of SMART‟s 
prototype, we formulated nine semi-hypothetical space missions to use in evaluation. Then, 
CTMC was employed to simulate SMART‟s behavior in nine missions to calculate the overall 
availability of the system and the time it spends in each repair stage. Finally, the common 
convention in evaluation resource overhead against the industry-standard TMR approach is to 
analytically assume that TMR requires 3 times the FEs‟ overhead plus the voter‟s overhead. This 
however is not always the case due to the abundance of triplication optimization algorithms that 
can do better than that. Thus, we relied on a standard triplication tool called BL-TMR to generate 
28 benchmarks to be used in evaluating SMARTs overhead.  
6.1. Semi-Hypothetical Use Cases  
The first step to evaluate SMART‟s ability to sustain demanding long missions is to provide 
semi-hypothetical use cases, meaning that the use cases are based on publically available data 
but with the assumption that SMART architecture is used on board. Based on values reported in 
published work and experimental results attained by SMART prototype, and to produce a set of 
use cases (UCs) to use in examining SMARTs performance, we report the following: 
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6.1.1. Soft-Fault Rate  
CREME-96 simulator was used in [31] to calculate predicted Soft-Fault Rate (FS) per day for 
different 90nm device type. Assuming Low Earth Orbit (LEO) with altitude of 800 KM and 
inclination of 22.0 degree, the reported SEU rate per day is 7.56 for Xilinx XQR4VSX55 90nm 
FPGA.  
This device has 24,567 slices [10], each slice has two LUTs (G and F). Thus, the final rate for 
SEU/LUT in hours is                                   . This value will be multiplied 
by the number of LUTs in each FE to determine the soft fault rate in each FE per one simulation 
hour. 
6.1.2. Soft-Fault Repair Rate  
We calculated the Soft-Fault Repair Rate (RS) based on scrubbing speed in the SMART JTAG-
based prototype to account for the worst case scenario, which takes around 39.56 seconds to 
initialize the boundary scan chain, download the bitstream, readback/verify the bitstream, and 
evaluate the FE for a wide window of functional input to ensure the SUE is corrected in the CBS.  
Even if ICAP is used to expedite the scrubbing process, the assumed value is still valid as one 
can always expand the evaluation window for the repaired FE to gain higher statistical 
confidence that the fault is indeed repaired.  
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6.1.3. Hard-Fault Rate 
In this work, Hard-Fault Rate (FH) is the rate of TDDB failures, due to many claims that 
radiation-hardened Virtex devices are radiation-faults immune. Based on Xilinx Published data, 
[36] predicts 10% of the LUTs in a circuit to be affected by TDDB per year under the most 
stressful conditions of tox=1.2 nm, oxide area=0.25 mm
2
, at 125 C and 3.0 V. The static signal 
probability is assumed to be 1 because the LUT is a lookup table that has all gates turned on all 
the time.  
For the sake of proper factorial experimental design, we assumed 3 levels of FS based on the 
environmental conditions, where the fault rate under demanding conditions is assumed to be 
10%, under moderate conditions is 5%, and under favorable condition is 1%. These values are 
relative to the adjusted FE size that takes into consideration the resource decomposition rate such 
that the FE ends up with 600 LUT/FE at the end of the mission time. The same aging rate 
dictated the length of simulation time as the system cannot function for more than 10 years given 
a hard fault rate of 10% of the LUTs per year.  
6.1.4. Hard-Fault Repair Rate  
Similar to FH case, we calculate three levels of Hard-Fault Repair Rate (RH) to establish full 
3x3 factorial experiment, the three levels of RH were calculated based on simulation results for 
OGA with different level of hard fault impact on the LUTs, where a hard fault can impact one, 
two, or four bit(s) of the LUTs. The associated repair rates correspond to rapid, intermediate, and 
lengthy repairs, respectively. The number of generations and the repair time/rate are depicted in 
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Table 12 below. Conventional TMR and scrubbing techniques commonly found in the literature, 
which do not have hard-fault repair, will have RH equals to infinity. Plugging finite large 
numbers for RH in the CTMC model that we will demonstrate in the next section caused the 
system to stay in faulty states from the point it is hit with a hard-fault until the end of the 
mission, this is because there will be no way to bring the system back into healthy stats if no 
hard-fault repair techniques are available. Thus, in CTMC analysis, we assumed the quick, 
intermediate, and lengthy RH rates to demonstrate the impact of finite changes of MTTR of 
hard-faults on the overall system behavior. 
Table 12: OGA Results for Various Numbers of Hard Faults 
Number of Faults 1 2 4 
Generations 3962 31352 63307 
MTTR (hours) 0.704415 5.573703111 11.25462 
RH (hours) 1.4196177 0.17941393 0.0888524 
The nine use cases and the simulation parameters are summarized in Table 13 below. The 
resulting 3x3 experiments represent nine semi-hypothetical scenarios for different operating 
conditions. RS and FS values are fixed for all 9 UCs; the variation that is seen in the table is due 
to the different number of LUTs required for different experiments to accommodate the 
decomposition rate of the LUTs. Only FH and RH are varied across the experiments as they 
represent the main focus of this work and demonstrate the true contribution of SMART over 
conventional repair techniques. The simulation time assumes that each year has 10,000 hours. 
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 Table 13: Fault and Repair Values of the Nine Use Cases 
UC # Description 
FH 
(per hour) 
FS 
(per hour) 
RS 
(per hour) 
RH 
(per hour) 
Simulation 
Time 
(hours) 
1 
Demanding conditions 
Rapid repair 
0.065753425 0.038466235 90.91 1.4196177 10,000 
2 
Moderate conditions 
Rapid repair 
0.006027397 0.007052143 90.91 1.4196177 20,000 
3 
Favorable Conditions 
Rapid Repair 
0.000723288 0.004231286 90.91 1.4196177 60,000 
4 
Demanding conditions 
Lengthy repair 
0.065753425 0.038466235 90.91 0.0888524 10,000 
5 
Moderate conditions 
Lengthy repair 
0.006027397 0.007052143 90.91 0.0888524 20,000 
6 
Favorable Conditions 
Lengthy Repair 
0.000723288 0.004231286 90.91 0.0888524 60,000 
7 
Demanding conditions 
Intermediate Repair 
0.065753425 0.038466235 90.91 0.17941393 10,000 
8 
Moderate conditions 
Intermediate Repair 
0.006027397 0.007052143 90.91 0.17941393 20,000 
9 
Favorable Conditions 
Intermediate Repair 
0.000723288 0.004231286 90.91 0.17941393 60,000 
6.2. Availability Analysis Using Markov Models 
The first evaluation metric that we present to qualify SMART‟s benefit over conventional TMR 
is reliability modeling using Continuous-time Markov Chains (CTMC).  CTMC is a stochastic 
modeling technique to predict a set of possible outcomes based on state-to-state transition 
probabilities.  The model has been recommended by IEC 61508 Standard for Functional Safety 
of Electrical/Electronic/Programmable Electronic Safety-Related Systems [101] as a way to 
analyze failure modes of electronic devices. CTMC relies on a state-transition diagram that 
depicts a state space of the chain, which is defined by all the states that the system can traverse 
during its operation, along with the possible transitions between the states with each transition 
being characterized by a transition probability. Based on these states and transitions, the model 
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can be solved analytically or simulated experimentally to calculate the probability of being in 
certain state based on the previous state. The steady-state solution can help quantifying the 
probability of being in a certain state on the long run, which can be very useful in reliability and 
safety modeling. Moreover, Monte Carlo simulation of the CTMC can predict the expected 
transitions that the system is likely to undergo with time. 
We intend to perform a comparative study using Markov tools to quantify the effect of having 
hard-fault repair in mission critical applications. The system that we model is RARS, which has 
three instances of the user applications and is capable of switching from duplex to triplex 
configuration, and vice versa. The resulting Markov state transition diagram is shown in Figure 
17. The state space consists of 10 different states, each represented by a circle in the diagram, 
indicating the state number (Sn), the state condition (Good or Faulty), and the number of soft and 
hard faulty FE‟s in that state, respectively. For instance, state S8 is said to be faulty because it 
has all FE‟s faulty, two of which have soft faults and one has hard fault. The states belong to 
vertical lanes that denote the total number of faulty FEs in RARS. 
The possible transitions between the states are characterized by one of the following rates: 
1. FS: Soft fault rate, denoting the SEU rate in the system  
2. RS: Soft repair rate, this is the time needed to scrub the CBS to restore the correct value 
of faulty LUTs 
3. FH: Hard fault rate, which in this work signifies the TDDB fault rate 
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4. RH: Hard repair rate, this is the time that the OGA needs to repair faulty FEs. 
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Figure 17: Markov State-Transition Diagram of RARS 
The system starts from an initial state S1, which has 0 faulty FEs and is in the good state. A soft 
fault can occur with a rate of FS to put the system in S2 (1,0), or a hard fault can occur with a 
rate of FH to put the system in state S3 (0,1). RARS is expected to stay error-free even with the 
existence of one faulty FE, at the expense of switching from the low power and area duplex 
mode to the high power and area triplex mode. Thus, S1 is not different from S2 and S3 in term 
of availability, but does consume less area and power. For all Sn (n>3), RARS will be 
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unavailable and will also consume high area and power similar to S2 and S3 because the triplex 
configuration is needed during repair. Repairs, whether they are RS or RH, will move the system 
from faulty states to healthier ones. 
6.2.1. Markov Configuration 
The black box view of the CTMC experiment is depicted in Figure 18 below. The inputs are 
already explained in the previous sections; they will be varied based on the use case under study 
as shown in Table 13. The first two outputs (Steady-State Availability and Steady-State Time in 
State) do not actually require running any simulation; they can be analytically calculated by 
solving a set of differential equations of the matrix representation of the CTMC. These steady-
state solutions of the CTMC can serve as an indication of the long-term behavior of the model, 
but they cannot be completely relied-upon in real engineering missions that run for finite periods 
of time. Thus, we extended the CTMC work to include Monte Carlos simulation for finite 
periods of operation with sufficient statistical significance to calculate the bottom three outputs 
of the model. 
CTMC
FS
RS
FH
RH
Mission Time
Steady-State Availability
Steady-State Time in State
Cumulative Time in State
Cumulative uptime/downtime
Availability = f(T, FS ,RS ,FH ,RH)
 
Figure 18: Functional Model of the CTMC Experiments 
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To perform these simulations, we used a publically available operation research tool based on 
Excel and VBA [102]. The tool provides an ample of features to perform various computations 
on a CTMC; it includes a steady-state Markov solver, Monte Carlo simulator, and other useful 
tools. The excel tool, as is, does not support running multiple simulations and reporting statistical 
significance of the results. Therefore, we developed a VBA wrapper around the Monte Carlo 
simulation module to aid in running multiple experiments for statistical significance purposes. 
The wrapper executes multiple experiments and then processes the large amount of generated 
data to calculate fixed-point time intervals for all runs based on a weighted average principle. 
The goal is to unify all Monte Carlos runs to fixed-time units to be able to average runs and 
provide confidence levels of the experiments. This post-processing step allowed the simulator to 
execute its random time strides and thus enabled it to switch to various states based on the actual 
transition probabilities.  
6.2.2. Availability Evaluation Metric Results 
Each use case was simulated 20 times to provide enough statistical significance. FH and RH are 
physically independent as the hard fault arrival rate is an uncontrollable event for SMART, 
whereas the repair mechanism is executed irrespective to the fault arrival assuming a single fault 
scenario and MTTR<MTTF. Consequently, no ANOVA were required to analyze the interaction 
effect of the experiment parameters. Table 14 below reports the 20-runs average of the 
cumulative time in each state for all the UCs. The 20-runs produced low standard deviation 
values for all calculated averages. To demonstrate the statistical significance of the results, we 
provide all 95% confidence intervals (alpha=0.05) of the measured averages in Table 15. 
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Table 14: Average of Cumulative Time in State for the Nine Use Cases 
S UC1 UC2 UC3 UC4 UC5 UC6 UC7 UC8 UC9 
1 86617.1 197416 598992 11119 162040 585007 31157 180556 592712 
2 110.433 45.2201 83.5574 14.3668 37.6925 81.7908 39.7021 42.2014 83.0391 
3 12015.3 2516.95 923.3729 24848.4 33194.18 14687.45 34308.25 18107.62 7144.62 
4 0.09638 0.01509 
0.004101
5 
0.01409 0.003113 
0.007519
5 
0.049475
1 
0.000390
6 
0.01094 
5 10.3220 0.41594 0.090234 21.1690 5.169533 1.313137 29.26737 2.807783 0.63295 
6 1096.85 20.7712 0.783642 36652.5 4428.781 221.4332 25121.46 1251.339 58.3688 
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 0.09406 0.01069 0.0039 0.02598 0.00119 0.00468 0.04846 0.00312 0.00996 
9 0.44219 0.00098 0 15.3885 0.323547 0.012548 10.60557 0.105731 0.00234 
1
0 
49.3238 0.09766 0 27229.0 293.4965 0.722656 9233.248 39.06087 1.36357 
A 0.98842 0.999893 0.999998 0.36018 0.976361 0.999627 0.655709 0.993533 
0.99989
9 
Table 15: Standard Error (alpha=0.05) of Cumulative Time in State for the Nine Use Cases 
S UC1 UC2 UC3 UC4 UC5 UC6 UC7 UC8 UC9 
1 54.0413 25.63603 20.806927 128.689 458.6283 219.3030 184.8870 177.1719 
108.406
1 
2 0.5206 0.4011 0.7582 0.2728 0.3856 0.6317 0.4579 0.4355 0.7836 
3 47.7744 26.0467 20.9827 146.946 346.58 225.428 113.355 167.343 109.964 
4 0.01364 0.008931 0.004485 0.00643 0.003586 0.006098 0.014215 0.000765 0.00592 
5 0.21827 0.03558 0.02292 0.32728 0.17359 0.11659 0.23309 0.10955 0.05251 
6 15.0511 2.201358 0.5452965 188.010 138.15027 26.15954 159.7461 55.86048 10.7571 
7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
8 0.0159 0.0062 0.0041 0.01 0.0016 0.0064 0.0102 0.0037 0.0066 
9 0.04699 0.00191 0 0.28084 0.03692 0.00982 0.14724 0.02415 0.00316 
1
0 5.32583 0.191403 0 226.063 36.234844 1.169738 135.2700 10.09050 2.25778 
A 
1.767 
E-04 
1.087 
E-05 
9.2 
E-07 
2.1974 
E-03 
8.072  
E-04 
4.352 
E-05 
2.1125 
E-03 
2.728 
E-04 
1.746 
E-05 
Table 14 can be of great importance in pre-deployment preparations as it can tell the system 
designers where to focus in order to handle the common case scenarios. For instance, none of the 
UCs has entered S7 (all 3 modules hit by SEU) due to the very low MTTR compared to the high 
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MTTF in the soft fault case. This analysis can impact design decisions such as the interfacing 
between the scrubber and the FEs or the number of ports in the reconfiguration ROM, as the 
system is highly unlikely to scrub three FEs at the same time. Similar conclusions can be drawn 
about S9 and S10 for UC3, and so on.  
The availability of the nine UCs are reported in the last column of Table 14, it is clear that the 
demanding conditions can greatly impact the system availability to levels below the accepted 
state-of-the-art standards (UC4: A=36%, UC7: A=65.6%). A mission operating in such harsh 
conditions must be equipped with quick repair mechanisms to be able to process the rapid arrival 
rate, and thus be able to produce relatively higher availability rates such as UC1: A=98.8%.  
The impact of lengthy repair is also demonstrated in Table 14. A rapid repair will move the 
system from 98.6% availability under worst conditions, to three nines under moderate 
conditions, to 6 nines under favorable conditions. This difference, yet apparently negligible at a 
100% scale, can make the difference in mission-critical applications that require the highest 
possible availability levels, especially when the mission is long enough to make these ones of 
tenths grow into hundreds of hours of system downtimes, as we will show shortly. Similarly, the 
impact of mission conditions on the performance of a particular fault-tolerance approach is great; 
such impact can be demonstrated by scrutinizing the results of UC 4, 5, and 6 which all utilize 
lengthy repair mechanisms. The mission conditions can elevate the system availability from 36% 
to 99.9%, making a huge impact on the mission success rate. 
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Table 14 only shows the cumulative time at the end of the simulation. To further explain the 
behavior of the system, we plot the cumulative downtime of each use case versus the mission 
time.  The UCs need to be grouped by FH because the hard fault rate will impact the maximum 
mission time. So, under the most demanding conditions of 10% of the LUT impacted by hard 
faults each year, the system can live for 10 years maximum, after which all LUTs will be 
impacted by faults.  
Figure 19 shows the cumulative downtime of the system with time. The first two figures, 
corresponding to the demanding and moderate conditions, are plotted on logarithmic Y-axis due 
to the huge divergence in cumulative downtime of quick, moderate, and lengthy repairs. For 
instance Figure 19.A shows that the mission that is equipped with quick repair mechanism 
resulted in 1,000 hours of system downtime, whereas a system with lengthy repair resulted in 
more than 60,000 hours of downtime, confirming the importance of efficient hard-fault repairs in 
SMART. 
On the other hand, Figure 19.C depicts the favorable mission conditions, it was plotted on a liner 
scale because of the relatively marginal difference between the use cases with the rapid and 
lengthy repairs. Even after running for 60 years, the system with the lengthy repair only 
cumulated approximately 225 hours of downtime. One can argue that in such favorable 
conditions a hard-fault repair mechanism would not be required, but this is really dependent on 
the mission type. If this is an imagining application aiming to capture explorative images then we 
might agree, but if the FE is designed for a more critical application, such as a power controller 
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or security-critical encryption circuit, then 225 hours, a little more than 9 days, can be really a 
significant period of time that can jeopardize the mission success rate. 
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C: Favorable Conditions 
 
Figure 19: Cumulative Downtime under the Nine Use Cases 
 
Figure 20 shows the availability of the nine use cases throughout the mission life time. The 
impact of the hard-fault rate (mission conditions) on the system availability is readily 
demonstrated. The system with lengthy repair shows A<0.4 under demanding conditions (Figure 
20.A), close to 0.98 under moderate conditions (Figure 20.B), and 0.9996 under favorable 
conditions (Figure 20.C). The availability of the use cases is also affected by the repair time as 
shown in the three figures, especially when the fault rate is high to push RARS toward faulty 
states without a repair mechanism with an MTTR that is low enough to bring it back to the 
healthy states. 
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C: Favorable Conditions 
 
Figure 20: Availability under the Nine Use Cases 
Figure 21 shows the percentage of time spent in each of the 10 states under each of the nine use 
cases. The 90 bars depicted in the figure shows huge variation and thus might be challenging to 
visually grasp, it is still clear that use cases 4 and 7, with demanding conditions and lengthy and 
intermediate repair, respectively, are the ones that register less presence in S1 and spend more 
time in S6 and S10.  
A practical way of studying Figure 21 is to combine the states based on their overall impact on 
the mission status, meaning that S1 by itself a distinguished state which guarantees that the 
system is available (no faulty FEs) and is running in reduced power and area modes through the 
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exploitation of the reconfiguration property of the FPGA to downgrade the redundancy level to 
duplex, with discrepancy monitoring to detect faults. A less desirable stats of the system in seen 
in S2 and S3, where the system is still available via triplex configuration of RARS, yet consume 
more power and area than S1, availability in these two states is exactly equal to S1 availability, 
but the system is less reliable as it cannot handle any further faulty FEs. The remaining states 
from S4 to S10 represent the least desirable system condition where it expends the triplex power 
and area yet is not sufficiently available. A design goal of SMART is to minimize the time spent 
in S4 to S10. 
 
 
Figure 21: Percentage of Time in Each State under the Nine Use Cases 
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Another important conclusion that can be drawn from Figure 21 is that the faulty states that are 
actually traversed throughout the mission lifetime are the ones that comprise hard faults, which 
are S3, S6, and S10. This can be attributed to the high MTTR for hard faults compared to soft 
faults. The states that feature soft faults are visibly negligible (though they were actually 
traversed), because SMART is able to exit them in very short time by applying PR-based 
scrubbing. In fact, Table 14 shows that S7 which represents three soft-faulty FEs was never 
visited even with very long simulation times (60 years), a clear indication that conventional 
repair techniques can efficiently handle soft faults, steering the attention to hard-fault repair as a 
vital requirement for autonomous fault-handling in mission critical systems running in harsh 
environments. 
Finally, to quantify the aggregation of the states of RARS, Figure 22 depicts the percentage of 
time spent on each of the operation phases under the nine use cases. (A) with lower power and 
area represents S1, (A) with high power and area combines S2 and S3, whereas (1-A) 
corresponds to states S4-S10. UC 3 with favorable conditions and rapid repair has almost 
negligible (1-A) presence, UCs 5 and 7 with demanding conditions and lengthy and intermediate 
repair, respectively, are the ones that spend time in (1-A) more than in (A), other use cases show 
mixed behaviors that correlates to the reaction time to faults and their arrival rates. Such figure 
can be constructed based on the mission expected conditions and the fault-tolerance system 
prototype results to predict the availability and the overhead associated with a particular mission, 
such level of prediction and control is greatly desired in multi-million missions that are required 
to maintain their objectives according  to high standards.  
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Figure 22: Operational Phases Distribution under the Nine Use Cases 
6.3. Area and Power Comparison to industry-standard Techniques 
The benefit of RARS over conventional TMR approaches in reconfigurable devices is that 
RARS actually makes use of the reconfigurability feature of the FPGA devices by selectively 
adding or removing the FEs based on the mission status and requirement. This comes at the 
expense of adding a small controller, which is the AE, to RARS, incurring certain overhead, 
called Overhead of Autonomic Element (OAE), over what a conventional TMR would require. 
However, if the mission conditions are favorable enough not to introduce any faults, RARS can 
theoretically save              compared to the conventional TMR that will consume power 
and area of an unused third FE. The duplex mode is assumed as a minimal requirement here to 
allow for fault detection through discrepancy detection. The overhead in this context can refer to 
any quantity that incur burden on the mission, such as area, power, cost, effort, etc… 
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Referring to the CTMC experiment in the previous section, we define Time in State 1 (TS1) as the 
period of time in which RARS is in S1 and thus offers power and area saving over TMR while 
providing the same level of availability. The component difference between RARS and TMR is 
shown in Figure 23 below. Operating in S1 (Duplex) will save the overhead of one FE and one 
Voter, but will still consume extra overhead for the AE component. Running in the triplex mode 
(1- TS1) will cause RARS to expend more power and area than TMR because of the added 
overhead of the AE, which is not required in a conventional TMR. 
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Figure 23: Component Differences between RARS and TMR 
Let the quantities of interest be denoted as shown in Table 16: 
Table 16: Overhead Analysis Quantities Definition 
Term Definition 
OFE Overhead of one FE 
OAE Overhead of AE (without the voter component) 
OV Overhead of the voter 
OTMR Overhead of the TMR 
ORARS Overhead of RARS 
ODX Overhead of RARS when it runs the duplex mode 
OTX Overhead of RARS when it runs the triplex mode 
OS Overhead saving by using RARS over conventional TMR 
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The Overhead of RARS is a weighted average controlled by TS1: 
                           (1)  
The duplex overhead is two times the FE overhead plus the AE overhead, whereas the triplex 
overhead is three times the FE overhead plus the AE and the voters overhead: 
              (2)  
 
                  (3)  
 
 
The goal is to calculate the overhead savings of RARS compared to TMR.  
 
   
          
    
 (4)  
 
6.3.1. Experimental Setup 
We have selected power and area as the two overhead metrics of interest in this work due to their 
quantifiable nature and direct impact on mission resources, and then we have compared RARS to 
various TMR configurations in term of the expected dynamic power consumption and the area 
requirements. We employed XPA [19] to measure the dynamic power consumption for the 
different system components. The XPA is part of the Xilinx ISE design suite and provides a way 
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to analyze the power profile of post-PAR designs, which is an advantage over the other 
alternative tool, Xilinx Power Estimators (XPE) [19], which relies only on mapping reports and 
thus ignores the details of the placement and routing in estimating power consumption. As for 
area requirement, the Xilinx flow generates the PAR report that includes a detailed description of 
the number of LUTs and other FPGA constructs that the design uses.  
The power and area results for the edge detection application that we developed were extracted 
experimentally from the XPA and the PAR reports. As for the TMR benchmark results that we 
intend to compare against, we have employed the automated design triplication tool, BL-TMR 
[18], which is a JAVA-based open-source tool that handles the generation of redundancy in 
FPGA designs in order to improve system availability. 
The BL-TMR tool is an EDIF-based one, which means that its primary input is the EDIF file, 
which is a non vendor-specific format to represent and exchange netlists and schematics of 
electronic circuits. EDIF generation is embedded in the Xilinx flow using the NGD2EDIF tool 
that can generate EDIF representation of the design from the Native Generic Database (NGD) 
file. The resulting EDIF file can undergo the triplication process of BL-TMR to generate the 
triplicated EDIF, which can be translated back to the Xilinx process file formats using the 
EDIF2NGD tool. This custom triplication flow is depicted in Figure 24 below, where the normal 
Xilinx flow is interrupted right after it generates the NGD file in order to apply the triplication 
using the BL-TMR redundancy generation flow. 
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Figure 24: Custom TMR-Insertion Flow Based on Integrated BL-TMR and Xilinx Flows 
The BL-TMR redundancy generation flow starts by executing the JAVA JEdifBuild tool, which 
takes the EDIF file as converted by NGD2EDIF and generates an intermediate jedif file that will 
be used throughout the redundancy injection process. Then, the jedif file is analyzed using the 
JEdifAnalyze tool in order to learn the Input Output Buffers (IOBs) and the feedback paths of the 
design, the resulting analysis is stored in a circuit description file (cdesc) for further use by the 
tool.  
Then, the JEdifNMRSelection tool is executed to select which parts of the user circuit to 
replicate. This tool is run in passes, each pass aims to perform further replication selection steps, 
including the redundancy degree (duplication or triplication) or the replication options (clocks, 
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IO, instances, etc…). The output of this tool is written to a replication description file (.rdesc) for 
further processing by the tool.  
After that, the JEdifVoterSelection tool is invoked to decide the locations of the voters that will 
be inserted to accomplish triplication, using different voter insertion algorithm. Finally, the 
JEdifNMR tool is invoked to actually triplicate the design based on the specified options in all 
the previous steps. The triplicated design is saved into an EDIF file and can be ported back to the 
Xilinx flow using the EDIF2NGD tool. 
In order to establish enough confidence when comparing RARS to other triplication approaches, 
we employed various triplication settings along with various voter insertion algorithms. The 
following list depicts the TMR configurations that will be used in the comparison. 
Voter Insertion location: 
1. Triplicate Logic (TL): Only internal logic, including clock signals, will be triplicated, 
without triplication of the IOs  
2. Triplicate Logic and Input ports (TLI): The logic and the input ports will be triplicated 
3. Triplicate Logic and Output ports (TLO): the logic and the output ports will be triplicated 
4. Triplicate Logic, Input, and Output ports (TLIO): Triplicates all logic, input, and output 
signals. 
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Voter Insertion Algorithm: 
1. Voters before Every Flip-Flop (FF) Algorithm: This algorithm will place a voter before 
the data input of every FF. The algorithm is very simple and does not require heavy 
analysis of the design, it guarantees that only one voter will be inserted in any timing 
path, reducing the negative timing impact of the triplication [18] 
2. Voters after Every FF Algorithm: Similar to the previous algorithm, but inserts the voter 
after the FF. This has produced the best timing results out of 15 benchmark designs [18] 
3. Basic Strongly Connected Components (SCC) Decomposition Algorithm: Applies 
Kosaraju algorithm [18] to remove all feedbacks from the SCC. Runs quickly but 
produces bad timing results compared to the other algorithms because it allows more than 
one voter in the timing path. 
4. Highest Fanout SCC Decomposition Algorithm: Reduces the number of voters using a 
heuristic search to find nets with high fanout as candidate places to insert voters. 
5. Highest FF Fanout SCC Decomposition Algorithm: Combines 4 and 2, it guarantees that 
only one highest fanout voter is inserted per timing path, by inserting it after the FF 
outputs, resulting in cutting more voters and thus protecting the timing paths and saving 
more area.    
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6. Highest FF Fanin Input: Finds the highest fan-in FF in the SCC that is a legal voter 
location. 
7. Highest FF Fanin Output: Same as 6, but inserts the voter after the identified FF. 
This has resulted in         triplicated designs, shown in Table 17, as benchmarks to be 
used in the comparison against RARS. 
6.3.2. Experimental Results 
The BL-TMR tool was run 28 times to generate triplicated designs of the FEs with the 
specification listed in Table 17. The resulting designs were first analyzed using the Xilinx PAR 
reporting tools to calculate the area overhead of each benchmark. The full results are shown in 
Table 18. We rely on the “Total equivalent gate count” as generated by the Xilinx tool to be the 
area overhead metric in this experiment. Benchmark number 5 (Highest Flip-Flop Fanout SCC 
Decomposition, Logic Only) resulted in the least number of gates, meaning it is the top design in 
the area category out of the 28 benchmarks. 
The expected used area in RARS is a function of TS1, ODX, and OTX, as shown in Eq.1. TS1 will 
be first theoretically set to different values of interest to analyze the behavior of RARS as an 
area-saver redundancy-based fault tolerance method. It will be later set to the values reported 
under the nine UCs that we presented in the CTMC experiments in the previous section to 
actually calculate RARS area requirements under those conditions.  
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But to start with, ODX and OTX must be calculated by synthesizing the sub-modules of RARS 
independently and generating the Xilinx PAR reports accordingly. The results of the FE, AE, and 
Voter areas are shown in Table 19. 
Table 17: 28 BL-TMR Triplicated Edge Detector Benchmarks 
Benchmark 
Triplication 
Location Voter Insertion Algorithm 
1 
logic only 
 
Before Every Flip-Flop 
2 After Every Flip-Flop 
3 Basic Strongly Connected Components (SCC) Decomposition 
4 Highest Fanout SCC Decomposition 
5 Highest Flip-Flop Fanout SCC Decomposition 
6 Highest Flip-Flop Fanin Input 
7 Highest Flip-Flop Fanin Output 
8 
logic and input 
ports 
 
Before Every Flip-Flop 
9 After Every Flip-Flop 
10 Basic Strongly Connected Components (SCC) Decomposition 
11 Highest Fanout SCC Decomposition 
12 Highest Flip-Flop Fanout SCC Decomposition 
13 Highest Flip-Flop Fanin Input 
14 Highest Flip-Flop Fanin Output 
15 
logic and output 
ports 
 
Before Every Flip-Flop 
16 After Every Flip-Flop 
17 Basic Strongly Connected Components (SCC) Decomposition 
18 Highest Fanout SCC Decomposition 
19 Highest Flip-Flop Fanout SCC Decomposition 
20 Highest Flip-Flop Fanin Input 
21 Highest Flip-Flop Fanin Output 
22 
logic, input, and 
output ports 
 
Before Every Flip-Flop 
23 After Every Flip-Flop 
24 Basic Strongly Connected Components (SCC) Decomposition 
25 Highest Fanout SCC Decomposition 
26 Highest Flip-Flop Fanout SCC Decomposition 
27 Highest Flip-Flop Fanin Input 
28 Highest Flip-Flop Fanin Output 
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Table 18: Area Results of the Twenty Eight Benchmarks 
Benchmark Slices 
4 
input 
LUTs 
Logic 4 
input LUTs 
Route-thru 4 
input LUTs 
bonded 
IOBs 
BUFG 
Total equivalent 
gate count 
1 1,294 2,148 1,878 270 63 1 20,629 
2 1,320 2,144 1,991 153 63 1 21,307 
3 1319 2148 1932 216 63 1 20,953 
4 1237 2006 1787 219 63 1 20,083 
5 1182 1925 1769 156 63 1 19,975 
6 1260 2079 1809 270 63 1 20,215 
7 1185 1928 1772 156 63 1 19,993 
8 1297 2173 1903 270 107 3 20,779 
9 1323 2145 1992 153 107 3 21,313 
10 1323 2149 1933 216 107 3 20,959 
11 1240 2007 1788 219 107 3 20,089 
12 1185 1926 1770 156 107 3 19,981 
13 1264 2080 1810 270 107 3 20,221 
14 1188 1929 1773 156 107 3 19,999 
15 1343 2229 1959 270 145 1 21,771 
16 1,416 2,289 2,136 153 145 1 22,833 
17 1,357 2,109 1,893 216 145 1 21,375 
18 1,256 1,980 1,761 219 145 1 20,583 
19 1,200 1,899 1,743 156 145 1 20,475 
20 1,304 2,037 1,767 270 145 1 20,619 
21 1,203 1,902 1,746 156 145 1 20,493 
22 1,370 2,253 1,983 270 189 3 21,915 
23 1,434 2,289 2,136 153 189 3 22,833 
24 1,388 2,109 1,893 216 189 3 21,375 
25 1,275 1,980 1,761 219 189 3 20,583 
26 1,218 1,899 1,743 156 189 3 20,475 
27 1,339 2,037 1,767 270 189 3 20,619 
28 1,221 1,902 1,746 156 189 3 20,493 
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Table 19: Area Results of RARS Sub-Modules 
 
Substituting the values in Eq.2 and Eq.3, ADX=15,115 gates, ATX=22,793 gates. ARARS can be 
calculated for any given TS1.  Table 20 shows ARARS for various TS1 and the saving over 
benchmark 5 that has the smallest area out of the 28 benchmarks. 
Table 20: RARS Area Savings over Benchamrk Five for Different TS1 Values 
TS1 
ARARS  
(in Gates) 
Area Saving of RARS  
over Benchmark 5 
0% 22793 -14.11% 
1% 22716.22 -13.72% 
10% 22025.2 -10.26% 
20% 21257.4 -6.42% 
30% 20489.6 -2.58% 
36% 20028.92 -0.27% 
37% 19952.14 0.11% 
40% 19721.8 1.27% 
50% 18954 5.11% 
60% 18186.2 8.96% 
70% 17418.4 12.80% 
80% 16650.6 16.64% 
90% 15882.8 20.49% 
98% 15268.56 23.56% 
99% 15191.78 23.95% 
100% 15115 24.33% 
 
Module Slices 
4 
input 
LUTs 
Logic 4 input 
LUTs 
route-thru 4 
input LUTs 
bonded 
IOBs 
BUF
Gs 
Total 
equivalent 
gate count 
One FE 348 616 526 90 64 1 6,495 
AE 
(without 
Voter) 
86 151 136 15 210 2 2,125 
Voter 71 107 107 0 169 1 1,183 
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One can see that the TS1 threshold after which RARS becomes beneficial in term of area is 37%. 
Missions that run 90% of the time in the Duplex mode (S1) can benefit from 20% area savings 
for the design example of the edge detector. To generalize the area saving potential over a 
spectrum of TS1values, we depict the relation between the total equivalent gate count of RARS 
and TS1. On top of that, we overlay the 28 triplication benchmarks area results on a secondary x-
axis, the results show that RARS will become more beneficial than all the TMR benchmarks 
when TS1 is approximately greater than 40%.  
 
 
Figure 25: RARS Area Overhead Relative to Twenty Eight Benchmarks 
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Next, the XPA tool was used to analyze the dynamic power consumption of the same 28 
benchmark designs. From the results that are reported in Table 21, it was noted that the dynamic 
power consumption is greatly affected by the presence of triplicated IO‟s, and thus the results of 
TLIO sets were only considered to select the power winner design to be fair to RARS, which 
triplicates the input and output ports. Therefore, the winning benchmark in the power category is 
benchmark 22 with 166.32 mWatt. 
 
Table 21: Power Results (in mWatt) for the Twenty Eight Benchmarks 
Benchmark Clock Input Output Logic Signals Total 
1 10.96 15.59 31.15 2.48 5.24 65.42 
2 11.19 15.59 31.15 1.23 4.19 63.35 
3 13.43 15.59 31.15 2.36 5.09 67.62 
4 12.14 15.59 31.15 1.99 4.55 65.42 
5 12.77 15.59 31.15 1.94 5.13 66.58 
6 12.49 15.59 31.15 2.45 5.26 66.94 
7 11.46 15.59 31.15 1.77 5.01 64.98 
8 21.01 46.76 31.15 3.89 3.39 106.2 
9 23.1 46.76 31.15 2.1 5.47 108.58 
10 19.25 46.76 31.15 3.22 4.87 105.25 
11 18.6 46.76 31.15 2.86 4.6 103.97 
12 18.24 46.76 31.15 2.8 5.54 104.49 
13 19.13 46.76 31.15 3.32 5.46 105.82 
14 16.48 46.76 31.15 2.63 5.21 102.23 
15 14.88 15.59 93.45 2.63 6.03 132.58 
16 12.07 15.59 93.45 1.67 4.26 127.04 
17 13.64 15.59 93.45 2.38 5.07 130.13 
18 14.01 15.59 93.45 2.03 4.83 129.91 
19 11.24 15.59 93.45 1.97 4.98 127.23 
20 13.96 15.59 93.45 2.47 5.07 130.54 
21 13.15 15.59 93.45 1.8 5.3 129.29 
22 18.89 46.76 93.45 3.05 4.17 166.32 
23 27 46.76 93.45 2.53 6.26 176 
24 21.7 46.76 93.45 3.24 5.56 170.71 
25 19.28 46.76 93.45 2.89 5.25 167.63 
26 21.7 46.76 93.45 2.84 5.83 170.58 
27 22.86 46.76 93.45 3.33 5.8 172.2 
28 18.95 46.76 93.45 2.67ss 5.7 167.53 
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Again, the same values were calculated for RARS sub-modules by synthesizing them 
independently and applying the XPA analysis to the resulting designs. The results, shown in 
Table 22, indicates that the majority of the dynamic power is consumed by the FE elements due 
to the amount of logic used in it compared to the AE and the Voter. The Voter and the AE 
consumed relatively equal amounts of dynamic power. 
Table 22: Power Results for RARS Sub-Modules 
Module Clock Input Output Logic Signals Total 
FE 6.2 15.59 31.15 1.11 1.69 55.74 
Voter 4.38 0 0 0.52 0.12 5.02 
AE (without Voter) 4.77 0 0 0.6 0.37 5.74 
 
Applying Eq.2 and Eq.3, we calculate PDX=117.22 mWatts and PTX=177.98 mWatts. PRARS can 
be calculated for any given TS1.  Table 23 shows PRARS for selected TS1 values and the power 
savings over benchmark 22 that consumed the least dynamic power in the eight TLIO 
benchmarks. The cutoff value for the power case is 20%, so any mission that stays in S1 for 
more than one fifth of the time will benefit from RARS to reduce power consumption while 
maintaining the same availability levels compared to the conventional TMR. 
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Table 23: RARS Power Savings over Design Twenty Two for Different TS1 Values 
TS1 Power 
Power Saving of RARS  
over Benchmark 22 
0% 177.98 -7.01% 
1% 177.3724 -6.65% 
10% 171.904 -3.36% 
19% 166.4356 -0.07% 
20% 165.828 0.30% 
30% 159.752 3.95% 
40% 153.676 7.60% 
50% 147.6 11.26% 
60% 141.524 14.91% 
70% 135.448 18.56% 
80% 129.372 22.22% 
90% 123.296 25.87% 
98% 118.4352 28.79% 
99% 117.8276 29.16% 
100% 117.22 29.52% 
 
Plotting the Power in mWatts versus TS1 will show linear savings with increased duplex time. In 
comparison with the 28 benchmarks, RARS can still be beneficial for power savings unless TLI 
or TL are used, but this would decrease the reliability of the design because not all IOBs are 
triplicated, introducing many failure points to the system.  
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Figure 26: RARS Power Overhead Relative to Twenty Eight Benchmarks 
 
Figure 27 depicts the percentage of power and area savings of RARS over the top two 
benchmarks, 5 and 22, except for the power of design 5 which does not include IOBs and thus 
produced very low power consumption at the expense of less reliability. All the three lines enter 
the positive region of the Y axis at TS1>37%. If the power is the main concern of the mission 
then any TS1>20% will mean that RARS will be more beneficial than any BL-TMR generated 
designs. 
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Figure 27: RARS Area and Power Savings Relative to the Top Two Benchmarks 
 
Note that the previous power analysis ignores the impact of the power consumption of the 
reconfiguration process. The power analysis aims to compare between the conventional TMR 
and the RARS approaches. This comparison only covers the organic hardware behavior of 
RARS; it does not actually include scrubbing for repairing soft faults or GA for repairing hard 
faults. We expect both TMR and RARS to follow the same reconfiguration pattern if they are 
designed to go into the scrubbing or the GA phases. In fact, RARS implement a TMR 
configuration when running the GA in order to use the discrepancy-based fitness evaluation 
feature. Thus, both approaches will be affected in the same fashion if the GA reconfiguration 
power consumption is considered.  
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As for the RARS Duplex-to-Triplex switching power, neglecting the reconfiguration process 
power consumption can only be acceptable if the configuration time is very low compared to the 
application running time, which can be achieved by two ways. 
First, by reducing the bitstream size through the use of PR rather than the full configuration 
approach. As we demonstrated in the experimental section, the bitstream size was reduced using 
the PR flow to 30.61 KB compared to 1.633 MB for the full static bitstream. This reduction in 
the CBS size led to decreasing the reconfiguration time to 1.8% of the original value, which 
should translate into comparable power saving during the reconfiguration process. 
Second, the configuration time can be vastly reduced by relying on the much-faster ICAP instead 
of the external configuration ports such as the JTAG. As mentioned previously, and in spite of 
the usage of the parallel Cable IV in the experimental setup, the intended deployment platform 
which will utilize the PowerPC processor will make use of the ICAP for all reconfigurations. The 
ICAP can reach download speed of up to 400MB/Sec compared to the 5MB/Sec for the parallel 
Cable IV that we used in experimental setup. The problem that faces most designers is that this 
speed is bounded by the limiting factor of fetching the CBS from the configuration memory into 
the ICAP with the same rate. Thus, the ICAP is able to support the maximum throughput of 400 
MB/Sec, but the bottleneck becomes how fast the application can fetch the configuration data 
from the memory. 
Several efforts in the literature have implemented CBS fetching mechanisms to match the speed 
of the ICAP. In [103], an implementation of BRAM next to the ICAP along with a finite state 
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machine (FSM) to drive the memory load operations into the ICAP are presented. The resulting 
system was able to write 4-byte words to the ICAP at a frequency of 100MHz, matching the 
maximum throughput made available by the ICAP. In [4], the lightweight hardware artNOC-
ICAP interface is developed to support fast Readback-Modify-Writeback (RMW) mechanism 
that achieves 40us configuration time per frame, again matching the maximum speed of the 
ICAP. Another successful approach to match the ICAP speed is presented in [104], based on 
Direct Memory Access (DMA) aided by master burst and BRAM caching techniques. Another 
extensive effort is demonstrated in [105] where the JTAG dynamic power consumption is 
measured via a digital oscilloscope from a Spartan III FPGA that does not have an ICAP 
interface. The reconfiguration time for a PR bitfile of 21KB was 34 ms, utilizing ICAP instead 
with a performance of 66MB/Sec on a Virtex II device would reduce the configuration time to 
0.32 ms, and this 99% reduction in configuration time would again yield considerable reduction 
in reconfiguration power. 
The final goal of this work is to combine the CTMC and the BL-TMR experiments into one 
holistic experiment that shows the expected savings of SMART over TMR in the nine use cases. 
We experimentally calculated the TS1 values of the nine UCs, and used these realistic values as 
an input to the weighted average in Eq.1 to calculate the area and power overhead of RARS 
under the nine UCs. The RARS expected values were compared against benchmarks 5 and 22 as 
the top designs in term of area and power, respectively. Table 24 shows the holistic experiment 
results, where TMR was the recommended approach over SMART only in UC4 and UC7. For 
the remaining use cases SMART consistently showed better power and area requirements.  The 
power savings ranged from 22% to 29%, whereas the area savings ranged from 17% to 24%. 
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Table 24: Combining Availability, Area, and Power Results 
UC 
S1  
(A, Low 
Power, 
low 
Area) 
S2, S3  
(A, High 
Power, 
High 
Area) 
S4-S10  
1-A, High 
Power, 
High 
Area) 
A  
(%) 
Avg 
Power 
Avg 
Area 
Power 
Savings 
over  
Design 
22 
Area 
Savings 
over  
Design 
5 
Recom-
mended 
Method 
1 86.704% 12.1379% 1.15828% 98.8417 125.3 15319.13 24.66% 19.22% SMART 
2 98.707% 1.28331% 0.01014% 99.9899 118 14284.5 29.05% 23.83% SMART 
3 99.833% 0.16663% 0.00012% 99.9999 117.3 14187.37 29.46% 24.27% SMART 
4 11.130% 24.8876% 63.9821% 36.0179 171.2 21833.57 -2.94% -9.83% TMR 
5 81.162% 16.5161% 2.32216% 97.6778 128.7 15796.86 22.64% 17.09% SMART 
6 97.522% 2.43057% 0.04736% 99.9526 118.7 14386.6 28.62% 23.38% SMART 
7 31.189% 34.3823% 34.4291% 65.5709 159 20104.55 4.38% -2.12% TMR 
8 90.189% 9.15584% 0.65490% 99.3451 123.2 15018.69 25.94% 20.56% SMART 
9 98.798% 1.19488% 0.00749% 99.9925 118 14276.64 29.08% 23.87% SMART 
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CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSION 
Reliability emerges as one of the most significant concerns in the new era of nano-scale devices 
[106]. Nano-electronic systems promise immense advancements in term of power, performance, 
area, and cost, making them ideal platforms to host many of the computing ideas that are yet to 
be explored in our modern days. However, existing reliability techniques might not be able to 
scale in compliance with the ever-shrinking device technology. Therefore, novel paradigms that 
exploit the massive underlying parallelism of the nano-scale devices might be needed. This 
dissertation explores the possibility of imparting self-x properties to enable these paradigms.  
7.1. Technical Summary 
The OC paradigm has been widely accepted as a potential model for future computing systems, 
where numerous independent computing agents can exchange sensory data and actuation 
knowledge to regulate system-level parameters, leading to the emergence of self-x properties that 
cannot be spotted at the individual component level. 
Therefore, an organically-inspired SMART approach was presented, which can adapt to runtime 
failures based on alternative configurations. This allows for use of a continuum of power and 
area utilizations versus reliability. The organic hardware layer provides decentralized awareness 
and control by means of distributed RARS module across the hardware fabric. The supervisory 
software layer provides the ability to assimilate hardware sensory information while providing 
vital centralization for decision-making. 
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RARS avoided the dilemma of choosing a fixed redundancy degree by deferring a commitment 
to a particular fault handling configuration until run-time. This approach, utilizing 
reconfigurability of SRAM-FPGAs, demonstrates an effective use of resources depending upon 
current mission conditions. TMR consumes three times the required resources to survive during 
the short periods of time when faults hit the application. RARS, in contrast, adapts to the various 
requirements at different stages of the mission by enabling just the right amount of spares. 
Unnecessary spares can be completely disabled or even replaced by other circuits. In the age of 
power-aware applications, where cooling and battery-life are as crucial as performance, RARS is 
able to save up to 30% of the power used by TMR, while still providing protection against 
transient and permanent faults. 
Offline repair is entirely undesirable in modern mission-critical applications whereby the system 
must show graceful degradation and partial ability to function even when being refurbished. 
Partial reconfiguration made it possible to keep the system online while under repair. It also 
enabled fast reconfiguration, reducing the repair time and increasing system availability. Finally, 
it allowed for the implementation of innovative solutions at the software layer, such as lazy 
scrubbing and intrinsic fitness evaluation.  
The software layer relied on a JTAG interface to communicate with the FPGA and to download 
partial bitfiles. This layer facilitated experiments with evolutionary repair where the fault 
recovery is not limited by the number of available spares. OGA, unlike other conventional GAs, 
supported features that are well-matched to the OC requirements. The model-free fitness 
function enabled the GA to be portable and scalable to fit any application domains. Direct 
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bitstream evolution reduced the mapping time of the genetic material into physical individuals, 
thereby boosting the performance of the GA. Finally, intrinsic evolution improved the accuracy 
of the GA because it allowed the evolution to happen on the actual hardware rather than a 
software model. 
7.2. Future Work 
Future work can target any aspects of SMART that were deemed out of the scope of this work, 
such as recovering faults in the AE. AE is considered as a golden element in this work, previous 
work by our research group has demonstrated successful methods to protect the voting logic 
[90]. Integration effort is considered to combine the two methods into one integrated system. 
Extending the power analysis to cover the GA process with the associated complexity of 
experimentally measuring and analytically modeling the configuration process power, can be 
another useful expansion to aid in predicting and controlling SMART in mission-critical 
deployments.  
A novel OGA based on Island-based GA (IGA) [64] can greatly contribute to the hard-fault self-
repair mechanisms of SMART. The proposed future work aims to map the islands of the IGA to 
dynamically reconfigurable FEs on the FPGA device. The goal is to grow and shrink the number 
of islands based on the availability of reconfigurable resources at any stage of the mission. 
Adding and removing islands will impact the MTTR of hard-faults and also change the 
dynamicity of the resource utilization of SMART.  
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For instance, if an island is to be retired due to fault scenarios or in order to utilize its 
reconfigurable resources for a different task, SMART needs to choose from many options 
regarding which island to retire and how to handle the individuals of that island. For example, 
SMART can retire the lowest fit island, which might be a costly decision if good building blocks 
of the GA are lost. It can also retire an island such that diversity-preservation is maximized. 
Another alternative is to retire any random island but rescue a selected set of individuals by 
migrating them to other islands. The question here becomes what are the selection criteria for 
these rescued individuals? Should that be fitness, diversity, or both? 
On the other hand, when SMART has a newly available reconfigurable block to make use of, and 
thus decides to populate a new island in order to expedite the evolutionary process, what would 
be the best way to construct the new island? Would that be creating a super island comprising the 
best performers across all other islands? Although this Pareto-preserving option seems optimal, it 
might not produce good solutions if the best performers across all islands have converged 
similarly, leading to a super island that lacks the genetic diversity to promote new innovative 
solutions. The other extreme alternative is to compose the island such that diversity is 
maximized, by analyzing the variance of selected individuals and picking the ones that are 
different from the rest. Randomly populating the new island with immigrants from other islands 
might lead to more diversity and thus promote better solutions  
These are all interesting question to answer, and we believe that IGA can be a rich field to 
analyze in the context of organic computing on reconfigurable devices due to its compatibility 
with the OC paradigm and its technical suitability for reconfigurable devices.  
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APPENDIX: COMMUNICATION PROTOCOL MESSAGES 
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This is a summary of the communication protocol messages 
Protocol Attribute Description 
Implementation Socket Communication 
Direction Bidirectional 
Communication Type Asynchronous (Producer/Consumer) 
Message – 1 
Message Name DISCREPANCY_REPORT 
Message Type String 
Message Source Hardware layer 
Message Destination Software layer 
Message Format 
AE_ID FE_ID TMR FAULT_ ARTICULATION_ INPUTMSG_ CODE
5
Log2  |AE|
2 1 n- bit Functional Input
TIME_STAMP
TBD
 
Message Trigger(s) Discrepancy detected by the AE 
Message Description 
This message is sent whenever an AE detects discrepancy 
among its FEs. The TMR flag is used to specify the 
configuration of the organic unit when the discrepancy was 
detected. A TMR flag value of 1 indicates that the 3 FEs were 
simultaneously used in voting scheme, and the FE_ID in this 
case specifies the discrepant FE, whereas a 0 value indicates 
the original configuration of two online FEs and one Cold-
spare standby (duplex mode), the FE_ID reflects the address of 
the cold-standby FE in this case. The n-bit 
FAULT_ARTICULATION_INPUT provides the AS with the 
actual input that articulated the discrepancy; this could be 
useful for the Software layer and/or RM to regenerate the fault 
scenario during the refurbishment process. 
 
Message – 2 
Message Name FE_STATUS_REQUEST 
Message Type String 
Message Source Software layer 
Message Destination Hardware layer 
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Message Format 
AE_ID FE_IDMSG_CODE
5
Log2|AE|
2
TIME_STAMP
TBD
 
Message Trigger(s) Software layer initiated according to the Cognitive Layer logic. 
Message Description 
This message is sent from the Software layer to the organic 
layer to query the status of any number of FEs. The addresses 
of the AEs/FEs can be specifically provided to target specific 
FE or a broadcast address (e.g. address zero) can be used to 
query multiple FEs. For example, if the AE_ID is 3 and the 
FE_ID is 0, the AE that has the address of (3) has to respond 
with three FE_STATUS_REPORT messages (Message-3) for 
each one of its FEs. Also, if the AE_ID field is zero and the 
FE_ID is 2, all AEs in the organic layer have to report the 
status of their FE with the address 2. It is apparent that an 
FE_STATUS__REQUEST message with both AE_ID and 
FE_ID fields filled with zero means a full broadcast to the 
organic layer to send the status of every single FE to the 
cognitive layer. 
Message – 3 
Message Name FE_STATUS_REPORT 
Message Type String 
Message Source Hardware layer 
Message Destination Software layer 
Message Format 
TIME_STAMP
TBD
AE_ID FE_ID STATUSMSG_CODE
5
Log2|AE|
2 3
 
Message Trigger(s) Response to Message-2 
Message Description 
Responding to Message-2, an AE has to send one 
FE_STATUS_REPORT message per FE to the Software layer. 
Contrary to message-2, The AE_ID and FE_ID fields cannot 
specify a broadcast address in this message; they have to 
explicitly indicate the sender identity. 
Message – 4 
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Message Name TMR_ACTIVATION_REQUEST 
Message Type String 
Message Source Software layer 
Message Destination Hardware layer 
Message Format 
TIME_STAMP
TBD
AE_IDMSG _CODE
5
Log2  |AE|  
Message Trigger(s) 
Software layer initiated according to the Cognitive Layer logic. 
It could be due to performance degradation below the mission 
requirements for this organic unit (FEs and AE). 
 
Message Description 
Software layer can send this message to one/all AEs in the 
organic layer to trigger TMR configuration activation. The 
targeted AE(s) respond by activating TMR among FEs and 
confirm back by sending Message-5 
(TMR_ACTIVATION_REPORT) 
Message – 5 
Message Name TMR_ACTIVATION_REPORT 
Message Type String 
Message Source Hardware layer 
Message Destination Software layer 
Message Format 
TIME _STAMP
TBD
AE_IDMSG_CODE
5
Log2  |AE|  
Message Trigger(s) 
- Response to Message-4 
- Autonomous response taken by the AE itself. 
Message Description 
Software layer described in message-4, this message is a 
confirmation from AE to Software layer that TMR has been 
configured among the three FEs Software layer requested or a 
notification to the Software layer that the AE has 
autonomously activated the TMR mode. 
Message – 6 
Message Name REFURBISH _REQUEST 
Message Type String 
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Message Source Software layer 
Message Destination Hardware layer 
Message Format 
TIME_STAMP
TBD
AE_ ID FE_IDMSG_CODE
5
Log2 |AE|
2
 
Message Trigger(s) 
Software layer initiated according to the Cognitive Layer logic. 
It could be due to one of the FEs was reported faulty, or due to 
performance degradation below the mission requirements. 
Message Description 
This message is sent from the Software layer whenever 
refurbishment is needed. For example this call can initiate 
running GA to repair faulty FE(s). The same principle of 
broadcast addressing described in Message-2 is applicable to 
this message.  
Message – 7 
Message Name REFURBISH _REPORT 
Message Type String 
Message Source Hardware layer 
Message Destination Software layer 
Message Format 
TIME_STAMP
TBD
AE_ID FE_IDMSG_ CODE
5
Log2 |AE|
2
FITNESS_ VALUE
Log2|Fitness|
 
Message Trigger(s) Refurbishment process is finished. 
Message Description 
This message is sent from the AE to Software layer upon 
refurbish completion. The final fitness value of the refurbished 
FE is reported in the message so that it can be used in future 
mission-specific decision making. 
Message – 8 
Message Name FE_STATUS_CHANGE _REQUEST 
Message Type String 
Message Source Software layer 
Message Destination Hardware layer 
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Message Format 
TIME _STAMP
TBD
AE _ID FE_IDMSG_CODE
5
Log2  |AE|
2
STATUS
Log2|STATUS|
 
Message Trigger(s) 
- FE is put under-repair. 
- FE was refurbished and the Software layer decides that it is 
eligible to be put online. 
- FE has failed to be refurbished and claimed un-repairable and 
hence should be decommissioned 
Message Description 
The Software layer can send this message to change the status 
of FE(s). Broadcasting can be used to specify more than one 
FE in a single command, provided that they will be changed to 
the same status. The target AE will respond by changing the 
status of the addressed FE(s) and send a confirmation of the 
change to the Software layer (as described in Message-2). 
Message – 9 
Message Name PING _REQUEST 
Message Type String 
Message Source Software layer 
Message Destination Hardware layer 
Message Format 
TIME _STAMP
TBD
AE_IDMSG_ CODE
5
Log2  |AE|  
Message Trigger(s) Software layer checks that the AE is alive. 
Message Description 
The Ping message is used by the Software layer to check the 
health of the AEs to check if it is minimally responsive. The 
broadcast addressing can be used to ping all the AEs in the 
organic layer. AEs respond to the Ping message by sending a 
PING_REPLY to the Software layer (As described in 
Message-10) 
Message – 10 
Message Name PING_REPLY 
Message Type String 
Message Source Hardware layer 
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Message Destination Software layer 
Message Format 
TIME _STAMP
TBD
AE_IDMSG_ CODE
5
Log2  |AE|  
Message Trigger(s) Response to Message-9 
Message Description 
This message is sent from the AE to the Software layer as a 
reply for the PING_REQUEST (Message-9).  
Message – 11 
Message Name RECONFIGURATION_REQUEST 
Message Type String 
Message Source Software layer 
Message Destination Hardware layer 
Message Format 
AE_ID FE_IDMSG_CODE
5
Log2|AE|
2
TIME_STAMP
TBD
CONFIG_ID_
TBD
 
Message Trigger(s) 
- AE is not responding properly (Any failure to respond such 
as ping failure)  
- Software layer decided to change the functionality of the 
organic unit. 
Message Description 
This message is sent from the Software layer to the AE(s) to 
change the configuration of the corresponding FE(s). The 
broadcast addressing can be used in this message. The AE will 
respond by downloading the requested configuration and reply 
with the RECONFIGURATION_REPORT message 
(Message-12)  
Message – 12 
Message Name RECONFIGURATION_REPORT 
Message Type String 
Message Source Hardware layer 
Message Destination Software layer 
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Message Format 
AE_ID FE_IDMSG_CODE
5
Log2|AE|
2
TIME_STAMP
TBD
 
Message Trigger(s) Response to Message-11 
Message Description 
This message is a response to the 
RECONFIGURATION_REQUEST (Message-11). 
Message – 13 
Message Name DUPLEX_ACTIVATION_REQUEST 
Message Type String 
Message Source Software layer 
Message Destination Hardware layer 
Message Format 
AE_ID FE_IDMSG_CODE
5
Log2|AE|
2
TIME_STAMP
TBD
 
Message Trigger(s) 
Take one FE offline in order to: refurbish, decommission, or 
switch back to normal duplex operation due to fault recovery 
achievement. 
Message Description 
As the Software layer has the capability to instruct Hardware 
layer to switch to TMR mode (Message-4), it can also switch it 
back to duplex mode under the situations mentioned above in 
(Message Triggers). FE_ID field specifies the FE module that 
will be taken offline (the other two FEs will be running in 
duplex mode) 
Message – 14 
Message Name DUPLEX_ACTIVATION_REPORT 
Message Type String 
Message Source Hardware layer 
Message Destination Software layer 
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Message Format 
AE_ID FE_IDMSG_CODE
5
Log2|AE|
2
TIME_STAMP
TBD
 
Message Trigger(s) Response to Message-13 
Message Description 
Once the AE changes the configuration to duplex mode, it 
reports back the new configuration to the Software layer, the 
FE_ID fields indicates the offline FE. 
Message – 15 
Message Name GET_OL_CONFIGURATION_REQUEST 
Message Type String 
Message Source Software layer 
Message Destination Hardware layer 
Message Format 
AE_IDMSG_CODE
5
Log2|AE|
TIME_STAMP
TBD
 
Message Trigger(s) 
Software layer initiated when it needs information about how 
the organic layer is organized 
Message Description 
The Software layer sends this message to request the 
configuration of the Organic Layer.  
Message – 16 
Message Name OL_CONFIGURATION_REPORT 
Message Type String 
Message Source Hardware layer 
Message Destination Software layer 
Message Format Adjacency list 
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Message Trigger(s) Response to message-15 
Message Description 
The Hardware layer sends this message to report the 
configuration of the Organic Layer, the organization of the 
organic units is sent in the format of an adjacency list. 
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